









A recurring debate, in the aftermath of mass atrocity, is whether 
states should pursue traditional justice through criminal prosecu-
tions or promote peace through alternative mechanisms like truth 
and reconciliation commissions (TRCs).  As scholars have increas-
ingly recognized, however, a multitude of mechanisms meant to 
deal with past wrongdoings tend to emerge during periods of tran-
sition.  Nonetheless, due to the legacy of this polarizing debate, ad-
ditional research is needed on how their work can be mutually re-
enforcing in practice.  Recent literature has explored whether the se-
quence of these mechanisms affects long-term outcomes, such as 
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democratic consolidation and respect for human rights, but not how 
their interaction in practice might contribute to these goals. 
This Article helps fill that void through an in-depth analysis of 
the interface between TRCs and traditional justice in the case of Gua-
temala, a country where over time both arose.  In addition to being 
the first study to gather and analyze the sentences in the cases that 
resulted in convictions for grave crimes committed during Guate-
mala’s thirty-six-year internal armed conflict, it bases its findings on 
over two dozen interviews with judges, prosecutors, and human 
rights attorneys who have firsthand knowledge of those cases.  The 
study also includes critical insights from the leadership of the TRCs 
that documented the atrocities committed during that period. 
What emerged from these primary sources is a compelling ex-
ample of how these mechanisms can be complementary.  On one 
hand, criminal justice proceedings, or the absence of them, can in-
form the work of TRCs.  On the other hand, although TRCs have 
traditionally been portrayed as second-rate substitutes for justice, 
they can serve valuable functions that promote rule of law.  For in-
stance, TRCs can act as essential investigators and custodians of ev-
idence in contexts where the state is complicit or directly involved 
in the underlying atrocities.  Additionally, they can be vehicles for 
liberalization, creating opportunities for alternative voices, norms, 
and narratives to surface.  Indeed, as the case of Guatemala shows, 
they can transform local judicial decision-making by diffusing inter-
national human rights norms and recasting the historical context in 
ways that influence how judges define and determine responsibility 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In the past, legal scholarship characterized transitional justice as 
a tug of war between the competing demands of “peace versus jus-
tice,” sometimes framed as “truth versus justice.”1  Generally, advo-
cates, who promoted “peace” as the top priority in times of transi-
tion, favored amnesties or truth and reconciliation commissions 
(TRCs) as justice substitutes, insisting that any greater accountabil-
ity could upset fragile peace and lead to backlash.2 Those who fa-
vored “justice” in the form of criminal prosecutions argued that in-
ternational law required it and that the rule of law could not be 
established until wrongdoers were punished for their crimes.3  
More recently, there is increased recognition that transitional 
justice solutions are not nearly so dichotomous.4  Instead, 
                                               
1 Miriam J. Aukerman, Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework for Un-
derstanding Transitional Justice, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 39, 81 (2002).  Ruti Teitel, who 
coined the phrase “transitional justice,” defines it as “the conception of justice as-
sociated with periods of political change, characterized by legal responses to con-
front the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes.”  Ruti G. Teitel, Transi-
tional Justice Genealogy, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 69, 69 (2003).  Naomi Roht-Arriaza 
critiques Ruti Teitel’s definition of transitional justice as unnecessarily abstract and 
legalistic.  In addition, she argues that Teitel’s definition implies a clearly defined 
period of time, although oftentimes transitions are not so demarcated and can last 
for decades.  Therefore, she defines transitional justice as a “set of practices, mech-
anisms, and concerns that arise following a period of conflict, civil strife, or repres-
sion, that are aimed directly at confronting and dealing with past violations of hu-
man rights and humanitarian law.”  NAOMI ROHT-ARRIAZA, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: BEYOND TRUTH VERSUS JUSTICE 1–2 (Cambridge Univ. 
Press ed., 2006). 
 2 See, e.g., Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors: Principle and 
Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice, 28 INT’L SECURITY 5, 43 (2003/2004) 
(“Trials do little to deter further violence and are not highly correlated with the 
consolidation of peaceful democracy.”); see also Max Boot, When ‘Justice’ and ‘Peace’ 
Don’t Mix, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2000, at A34 (citing the post-World War II war crimes 
tribunals as an example of balancing justice and peace principles in a post-conflict 
context). 
 3 See, e.g., Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Hu-
man Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L. J. 2537, 2540 (1991) (arguing that 
“the central importance of the rule of law in civilized societies requires, within de-
fined but principled limits, prosecution of especially atrocious crimes”). 
 4 See Chandra Lekha Sriran, Remarks at ASIL Proceedings: Transitional Justice 
and Peacebuilding: Tensions and Complementarities, in 107 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 83 
(2013) (discussing the complementarities and tensions between justice and peace-
building); Dustin N. Sharp, Beyond the Post-Conflict Checklist: Linking Peacebuilding 
and Transitional Justice Through the Lens of Critique, 14 CHI. J. INT'L L. 165 (2013); 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss3/4
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transitional justice tends to be sequenced, with post-conflict societies 
over time resorting to a combination of mechanisms, often with 
overlapping goals.5  Indeed, in many post-conflict countries around 
the world, truth commissions have documented evidence of inter-
national crimes, which is later useful in criminal prosecutions.6 
The use of multiple transitional justice mechanisms in post-con-
flict countries is not likely to abate.  This trend has increased in part 
due to the proliferation of prosecutions in the last few decades, 
which is the result of a normative shift toward greater accountability 
for human rights violations.7  In the past, claims of sovereign rights 
effectively shielded egregious human rights abusers from liability 
for their crimes.8  Presently, the steady rise of trials, described by 
Kathryn Sikkink as the “justice cascade,” has meant that crimes that 
took place many years ago are being prosecuted for the first time 
years, even decades, after they were committed.9  Particularly with 
the increased resort to international criminal law, either through the 
International Criminal Court, foreign courts exercising universal ju-
risdiction, ad hoc tribunals created by the United Nations (UN), or 
hybrid tribunals, instances in which truth commissions and courts 
operate in the same space, simultaneously or in sequence, will likely 
grow.10  Thus, the appropriate interface between TRCs and courts 
                                               
Laurel E. Fletcher, Harvey M. Weinstein, & Jamie Rowen, Context, Timing and the 
Dynamics of Transitional Justice: A Historical Perspective, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 163 (2009). 
 5  Geoff Dancy & Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Timing, Sequencing, and Transitional 
Justice Impact: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of Latin America, 16 HUM. RTS. REV. 
321 (2014). 
 6  See generally TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND COURTS: THE TENSION BETWEEN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH (William A. Schabas & Shane Darcy 
eds., 2004) (studying the use of truth commissions in a number of post-conflict 
countries); see also ROHT-ARRIAZA, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY, supra note 1, at 3 (noting that both the Argentine Sábato Commission and 
Chile’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission turned over their findings to the 
courts). 
 7  KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE CASCADE: HOW HUMAN RIGHTS PROSECUTIONS 
ARE CHANGING WORLD POLITICS 3 (2011) (highlighting the increase in prosecutions 
worldwide). 
 8  BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
DOMESTIC POLITICS 3 (2009) (“The most striking change is the fact that it is no longer 
acceptable for a government to make sovereignty claims in defense of egregious 
rights abuses.”).  
 9  SIKKINK, supra note 7. 
 10 Since states that have ratified the Rome Statute have expressly agreed to 
either punish the perpetrators of international crimes or cede jurisdiction to the In-
ternational Criminal Court to do so, criminal justice will be an inevitable compo-
nent of any transitional justice process in these countries.  See William A. Schabas, 
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will continue to be a central question in transitional justice debates.  
Emerging scholarship addressing this trend has tended to focus 
on optimizing the order of transitional justice mechanisms.11  The 
emphasis has been on whether the various sequencing of these mech-
anisms affects long-term outcomes, such as democratic consolida-
tion and respect for human rights, but not on how their interaction 
in practice might contribute to these goals.12  
In an effort to fill that gap, as a Fulbright Scholar, I engaged in 
original field research in Guatemala and Spain examining the inter-
play between the transitional justice mechanisms that were a re-
sponse to Guatemala’s internal armed conflict.  Over a span of six 
months, I interviewed over two dozen judges, prosecutors, human 
rights attorneys, and staff from the two Guatemalan TRCs.  I also 
obtained and reviewed the full record of the case brought in Spain 
against the Guatemalan generals who were the alleged engineers of 
numerous mass atrocities against the Mayan population in Guate-
mala.  Most significantly, I am the first researcher to have collected 
and analyzed the sentences in the cases before Guatemalan courts 
that resulted in convictions for grave crimes committed during the 
armed conflict.  I reviewed all of these decisions with an eye toward 
assessing how the findings and evidence from TRCs influenced ju-
dicial decision-making. 
The Guatemalan transitional justice experience is illuminating 
on this question because Guatemala employed a variety of transi-
tional justice mechanisms to address the gross human rights viola-
tions that occurred during its thirty-six-year armed conflict.  In the 
immediate aftermath of the conflict, Guatemala opted for a UN-
backed truth commission coupled with an amnesty law, which some 
                                               
Introduction to TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND COURTS: THE TENSION BETWEEN CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE AND THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH, supra note 6, at 1–2 (discussing the potential 
influence of international institutions on TRCs in the post-conflict environment). 
 11 See, e.g., Tricia D. Olsen, Leigh A. Payne, & Andrew G. Reiter, The Justice 
Balance: When Transitional Justice Improves Human Rights and Democracy, 32 HUM. 
RTS. Q. 980, 1005 (2010) (claiming that “delayed justice, or sequencing trials after 
amnesties, allows for the justice balance that improves human rights and democ-
racy”). 
 12 Elin Skaar, Cath Collins, & Jemima García-Godos, Analytical Framework, in 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN LATIN AMERICA: THE UNEVEN ROAD FROM IMPUNITY 
TOWARDS ACCOUNTABILITY 25, 28 (Elin Skaar, Jemima García-Godos, & Cath Collins 
eds., 2016) (“In particular, although few countries have employed only a single 
transitional justice in isolation, the existing literature rarely considers interaction 
effects explicitly.  Another key issue, often flagged but rarely explored fully in the 
literature, is precisely how, rather than simply whether, timing and sequencing in 
the adoption of TJMs affects medium- and long-term outcomes.”). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss3/4
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believed were designed to ensure everlasting impunity.  Skeptical of 
the restrictive mandate of this truth commission, the Catholic 
Church established its own independent truth commission that, un-
like the UN-backed commission, named those responsible for grave 
international crimes.  At the same time, victims who viewed these 
truth commissions as inadequate substitutes for justice continued to 
push for prosecutions.  Although a few low-level paramilitary offi-
cials were successfully convicted, the power that the perpetrators 
still held in Guatemala made prosecutions of the high command of 
the military politically infeasible.13  With time, however, prosecu-
tions of the planners and organizers of crimes committed during the 
armed conflict began to take place, first in Spain and now, strikingly, 
in Guatemala; such prosecutions would have been unthinkable 
when the crimes occurred some thirty years prior. 
The Guatemalan experience illustrates the interdependence of 
the two post-conflict strategies in practice: once thought to be anti-
thetical to justice, “truth” has played a surprisingly important role 
in these prosecutions.  A close examination of the sentences in Gua-
temala reveals that justice has actually been “truth full,” with the 
reports and other materials from truth commissions often being ad-
mitted into evidence.  However, the normative force of truth com-
missions’ work in judicial decision-making has largely been over-
looked in the context of transitional justice.14  Notably, the “truth” 
                                               
 13 Andrew N. Keller, To Name Or Not To Name? The Commission for Historical 
Clarification in Guatemala, Its Mandate, and the Decision Not to Identify Individual Per-
petrators, 13 FLA. J. INT’L L. 289, 297–301 (2001) (discussing the political compromise 
of the CEH).  The National Reconciliation Law provided some exceptions to the 
amnesty.  For example, enforced disappearances, genocide, torture, and other 
crimes that do not have a statute of limitation could all still be prosecuted under 
the law.  Decreto No. 145 (1996), Ley de Reconciliation Nacional [National 
Reconciliation Law], 54 Diario De Centro America (Guat.) (“La extinción de la 
responsabilidad penal a que se refiere esta ley, no será aplicable a los delitos de 
genocidio, tortura y desaparición forzada, así como aquellos delitos que sean 
imprescriptibles o que no admitan la extinción de responsabilidad penal, de 
conformidad con el derecho interno o los tratados internacionales ratificados por 
Guatemala.”); see also Margaret Popkin, Guatemala’s National Reconciliation Law: 
Combating Impunity or Continuing It?, 24 REVISTA INSTITUTO INTERAMERICANO DE 
DERECHOS HUMANOS 173, 173 (1997), http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/publica/li-
brev/rev/iidh/cont/24/dtr/dtr7.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MT5-E6PR] (“[I]t may 
still be nearly impossible to prosecute most of the worst crimes committed during 
the armed conflict.”).  
 14 For a broader analysis of how the reports of non-judicial entities influence 
judicial decision-making, see Pammela Quinn, Advancing the Conversation: Non-Ju-
dicial Voices and the Transnational Judicial Dialogue, in EXPERTS, NETWORKS, AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 47 (Holly Cullen, Joanna Harrington, & Catherine Renshaw 
eds., 2017). 
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presented in these reports established historical narratives around 
which judges defined crimes and attributed responsibility, particu-
larly to high-level officials.  The truth commissions also helped to 
diffuse international human rights norms at the local level.  
The implications of these findings usher in a dramatically differ-
ent way of conceptualizing transnational justice as pluralist.  Draw-
ing inspiration from the frame of legal pluralism and building off 
emerging research in the political science arena on sequencing, I en-
courage lawyers and legal scholars to develop legal rules and judi-
cial norms to facilitate the operation of various legal and quasi-legal 
institutions in the same space.15  I argue that post-conflict pluralism 
can be a vehicle for liberalization because it creates additional op-
portunities for norm diffusion and contestation.  In addition, I cau-
tion policy-makers not to underestimate the value of “historical clar-
ification” in advancing justice and creating roadmaps for 
prosecutions that are strategic rather than scattershot.  For this rea-
son, I suggest that we should design transitional justice systems and 
adopt judicial norms that encourage post-conflict pluralism.  
In Section 2, I posit a theory that justice in post-conflict societies 
should be a fundamentally pluralist endeavor and advocate that we 
embrace multifaceted transitional justice, rather than try to recast it 
within the truth-versus-justice paradigm.  To set the stage for an 
analysis of post-conflict pluralism in Guatemala, Section 3 provides 
a more in-depth description of my methodology and essential back-
ground information, including the history of the internal armed con-
flict in Guatemala and a description of the various mechanisms and 
methods that emerged to address grave crimes committed during 
this period.  Section 4 describes how the truth telling documented 
by TRCs contributed to prosecutions in Guatemala and Spain.  In 
particular, I highlight how these truth commissions provided judges 
with the necessary historical context to understand the nature of the 
crimes, explained modus operandi, established the chain of com-
mand by exposing the organizational structure of the military, and 
described the collective and enduring harm suffered because of the 
crimes.  In Section 5, using the example of Guatemala as a launching 
point, I identify the specific ways in which truth commissions can 
                                               
 15 Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1155 (2007) 
(“[N]ormative conflict among multiple, overlapping legal systems is unavoidable 
and might even sometimes be desirable, both as a source of alternative ideas and as 
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move the needle forward on justice, by diffusing international law, 
recounting norm-shifting narratives, and acting in the place of frag-
ile or compromised state institutions in the wake of mass atrocity.  
 
2.  THE MOVE TOWARD A PLURALIST CONCEPTION OF TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE 
 
Transitional justice scholars have long been on a quest for the 
ideal mechanism or combination of mechanisms that will ensure the 
long-term success of all post-conflict countries.  Initially, discourse 
on transitional justice emphasized that there was a choice to be made 
between peace and justice in the periods of transition to democracy.  
For instance, Samuel Huntington discussed the decision to “prose-
cute and punish or to forgive and forget.”16  Generally, advocates 
who favored “peace,” in the form of amnesties and truth commis-
sions, insisted that greater accountability could upset fragile negoti-
ated peace agreements and lead to backlash.17  The general under-
standing was that TRCs were “a second-best alternative when trials 
were seen as too destabilizing or politically infeasible.”18  Alterna-
tively, those who favored “justice” argued that the rule of law could 
not be established until wrongdoers were punished for their 
crimes.19 
Despite the focus on this dichotomy, in post-conflict countries, 
transitional justice mechanisms rarely occurred in isolation.20  In 
practice, they tend to be sequenced, or in a few cases, occur simulta-
neously.21  In a sense, transitional justice in post-conflict countries 
                                               
 16 SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 211 (1991). 
 17 See, e.g., Snyder & Vinjamuri, supra note 2, at 43–44 (“Trials do little to deter 
further violence and are not highly correlated with the consolidation of peaceful 
democracy.”); see also Boot, supra note 2, at A34. 
 18 Schabas, Introduction, supra note 6, at 1.  See also ROHT-ARRIAZA, 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 1, at 3 (stating that 
“the model of a ‘truth commission’ gained force as a ‘second-best option’ where 
trials were deemed too destabilizing”). 
 19 See, e.g., Orentlicher, supra note 3, at 2540 (1991) (arguing that “the central 
importance of the rule of law in civilized societies requires, within defined but prin-
cipled limits, prosecution of especially atrocious crimes”). 
 20 Skaar et al., TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 12, at 29 
(noting that there is “an ever-expanding toolbox of transitional justice mecha-
nisms”). 
 21 Dancy & Wiebelhaus-Brahm, supra note 5. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
  
758 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 39:3 
evolved faster than the scholarship did.22  As a consequence, at least 
rhetorically, there is increasing recognition that justice and peace are 
mutually re-enforcing.  The UN has now adopted a multi-faceted 
approach that combines measures to achieve justice, truth, repara-
tion, and guarantees of non-repetition.23  In his report on the rule of 
law in post-conflict societies, then-UN Secretary-General Kofi An-
nan stated, “[j]ustice, peace and democracy are not mutually exclu-
sive objectives, but rather mutually reinforcing imperatives.”24  In 
September 2009, then-UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon asserted 
that “the debate is no longer between peace and justice, but between 
peace and what kind of justice.”25  The European Union has stated 
that it is “convinced that peace and justice are not contradictory aims 
. . . [and] that lasting peace cannot be achieved without a suitable 
response to calls for individuals to be held accountable for the most 
serious international crimes.”26 
The literature, particularly in the political science arena, has thus 
shifted to examine whether there is an optimal sequencing of mech-
anisms that generate the best outcomes for democracy and human 
rights.27  To some extent, however, the exploration of sequencing has 
replayed the familiar truth versus justice debate.  On one hand, some 
believe that a slow approach to justice is best, with peace, generally 
achieved via amnesties and truth commissions, being prioritized, 
before any attempts at accountability are undertaken.28  Rather than 
                                               
 22 Alexander Dukalskis, Interactions in Transition: How Truth Commissions and 
Trials Complement or Constrain Each Other, 13 INT’L. STUD. REV. 432, 432 (2011). 
 23 See generally U.N. Secretary-General, Guidance Note of the Secretary General: 
United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice (Mar. 2010), 
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/TJ_Guidance_Note_March_2010FINAL.pd
f [https://perma.cc/57FH-W64B]. 
 24  U.N. Secretary-General, The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict 
and post-conflict societies, 1, S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004), https://un-
docs.org/S/2004/616 [https://perma.cc/K5H2-QL3Z]. 
 25 Press Release, Secretary-General, Honoring Geneva Conventions, Secre-
tary-General Says Debate ‘No Longer between Peace and Justice but between Peace 
and What Kind of Justice,’ U.N. Press Release SG/SM/12494, (Sept. 26, 2009), 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sgsm12494.doc.htm 
[https://perma.cc/5PBC-BYVM]. 
 26 European Union Press Release 11900/08, Declaration by the Presidency on 
Behalf of the EU to Mark the 10th Anniversary of the Rome Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (July 16, 2008), http://www.europa-eu-un.org/arti-
cles/en/article_8025_en.htm [https://perma.cc/SU4W-ZQ38]. 
 27 Skaar et al., supra note 12, at 28. 
 28 See Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 4, at 212 (arguing that the “tortoises” 
who have taken their time before pursuing criminal prosecutions have fared better 
than the “hare” that rushed to judgment); Joanna R. Quinn, Chicken and Egg? 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss3/4
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rejecting justice wholesale, they argue that prosecutions should not 
be attempted until the political transition has been stabilized.  Oth-
ers, like Human Rights Watch, warn that peace first, justice later, in 
practice means no justice at all, which in their view will ultimately 
undermine long-term stability.29   
The tight hold of the truth-versus-justice debate, as evinced by 
its current reverberations in the literature on sequencing, in part is a 
result of the legal profession’s understanding of the law as linear 
and insular.  I contend that this need to choose emerges from our 
narrow “jurispathic” conception of justice, in which law must be hi-
erarchical and courts supreme.30  Those who believe most fervently 
in the need for traditional notions of criminal responsibility in post-
conflict societies to take precedence reflect a kind of legal centralism.  
Legal centralism is the idea that “law is and should be the law of the 
state, uniform for all persons, exclusive of all other law, and admin-
istered by a single set of state institutions.”31  One of the precepts of 
legal centralism is that “the state is the best or only hope for the re-
alization of liberal democratic values, such as democracy, equality, 
human rights, and the rule of law.”32  To legal centralists, all other 
normative institutions are secondary and subordinate to the law and 
institutions of the state.33  
It is this conceptual hegemony of the state as the preeminent 
                                               
Sequencing in Transitional Justice: The Case of Uganda, 14 INT’L J. OF PEACE STUD. 35, 37 
(2009) (“It may well be that the cessation of hostilities needs to be a certainty before 
embarking on a process of transitional justice.”); Lucy Hovil & Joanna R. Quinn, 
Peace First, Justice Later: Traditional Justice in Northern Uganda at 17–19 (Refugee Law 
Project Working Paper No. 17, July 2005), http://reliefweb.int/report/uganda/ref-
ugee-law-project-working-paper-no-17-peace-first-justice-later 
[https://perma.cc/ML8X-JJQ4] (emphasizing the importance of ending the conflict 
in Uganda first before determining what system of justice to impose).  Similar ar-
guments were made during the Review Conference for the Rome Statute in Kam-
pala on June 2, 2010. 
 29 Human Rights Watch, Seductions of “Sequencing”: The Risks of Putting Justice 
Aside for Peace (2010), https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/03/18/seductions-se-
quencing [https://perma.cc/GAE8-TQYZ] (recognizing that countries in transition 
or negotiating peace deals face difficult choices but also believing that neglecting 
accountability for egregious crimes in the aftermath of concluding a peace agree-
ment can be and often is detrimental to long-term stability). 
 30 Robert M. Cover, Foreward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 41 
(1983). 
 31 William Twining, Normative and Legal Pluralism: A Global Perspective, 20 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 473, 498 (2010) (quoting John Griffiths, What is Legal Plural-
ism?, 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM AND UNOFFICIAL L. 1, 3 (1986)). 
 32 Twining, supra note 31, at 499. 
 33 Griffiths, supra note 31, at 3. 
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lawmaker and enforcer that, to some extent, limits further develop-
ment of transitional justice.  Those in favor of justice view truth com-
missions as nothing other than second-rate substitutes for criminal 
prosecutions, thereby overlooking their important contributions to 
the rule of law, which this Article documents.  However, the legal 
centralists’ reliance on the state warrants especially strong skepti-
cism in post-conflict societies, where the state has perpetrated or ac-
quiesced to violence.  
Instead of being trapped in the dichotomies that have dominated 
the field for decades, I urge transitional scholars and practitioners to 
adopt a legal pluralism frame when conceptualizing and examining 
transitional justice.  Legal pluralists believe that legal centralism is 
“a myth, an ideal, a claim, an illusion.”34  Instead, Griffiths claims, 
“Legal pluralism is fact.”35  Legal pluralism is “a theory or system 
that recognizes more than one ultimate substance or principle.”36  
Legal pluralism accepts, and even champions, the benefits of multi-
ple, overlapping legal or quasi-legal systems.37  Instead of seeking 
harmonization and hierarchy, legal pluralism favors diversity in le-
gal systems as a means to generate “alternative ideas and as a site 
for discourse among multiple community affiliations.”38  Legal plu-
ralism was first noted by anthropologists who documented how in-
digenous norm-setting institutions remained influential and some-
times dominant in post-colonial contexts even when the colonial 
state authority actively tried to displace them.39  Sally Merry Engle 
refers to this class of legal pluralism as “classic legal pluralism.”40  
Political theorists have since observed that legal pluralism is not 
limited to colonial contexts, where local norms conflicted or merged 
with Western ones.  In western societies, a host of norm-setting in-
stitutions ranging from churches to business associations may set 
rules outside of the official state rulemaking process.41  Sally Engle 
Merry explains that “nonstate forms of normative ordering are more 
difficult to see” in societies without colonial pasts, but nevertheless 
                                               
 34  Griffiths, supra note 31, at 4. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Twining, supra note 31, at 477. 
 37 Berman, supra note 15, at 1155. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. at 1170. 
 40 Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 869, 872–74 (1988). 
 41 Berman, supra note 15, at 1172. 
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present.42  In these contexts, legal pluralism “center[s] on a rejection 
of the law-centered-ness of traditional studies of legal phenomena, 
arguing that not all law takes place in the courts.”43  These more re-
cent understandings of legal pluralism envision lawmaking and en-
forcing as much more porous, multi-directional, and non-hierar-
chical.44  So, by way of illustration, “the family and its legal order 
are shaped by the state, but the state in turn is shaped by the family 
and its legal order because each is a part of the other.”45 
While legal pluralists have historically focused on the relation-
ship between state and internal non-state law, more recently, in re-
sponse to concerns about legal fragmentation in the global legal or-
der, legal scholars have utilized legal pluralism as a helpful frame 
for grappling with the growing number of international legal and 
quasi-legal institutions.46  For example, Mark Drumbl applied legal 
pluralism to international criminal justice when analyzing the inter-
play between international courts, ad hoc tribunals, hybrid courts, 
and national courts.47 Applying legal pluralism to the international 
arena more broadly, Paul Schiff Berman argued that the pluralist 
“framework is essential if we are to more comprehensively concep-
tualize a world of hybrid legal spaces.”48  According to Berman, in-
ternational law scholars have generally ignored hybridity in the law 
and tried to situate disputes as either domestic or international.  Ra-
ther, he contends that “the global legal system is an interlocking web 
of jurisdictional assertions by state, international, and non-state nor-
mative communities.”49  Global legal pluralists thus examine how 
local actors might either deploy, change, or resist international, 
transnational, or non-state norms and how these norms may also be 
transformed in the process.50  The emphasis is on the persuasive 
power of these norm-setting institutions rather than how their 
                                               
 42 Merry, supra note 40, at 873. 
 43 Id. at 872–74. 
 44 Id. at 878. 
 45 Id. at 883. 
 46 William Burke-White, International Legal Pluralism, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 963 
(2003); Paul Berman, The New Legal Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 225, 237 
(2009). 
 47 Mark Drumbl, Pluralizing International Criminal Justice, 103 MICH. L. REV. 
1295  (2005) 
 48 Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 15, at 1159. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Berman, The New Legal Pluralism, supra note 46, at 232, 236. 
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ranking in a legal hierarchy influences their coercive authority.51  So, 
for example, global legal pluralism is at work when the findings of 
a commission of inquiry spur legal activity in the domestic courts of 
the abuser’s home country or when a nonbinding decision by the 
International Court of Justice influences how state courts in the 
United States rule on a case.52 
 The legal pluralism frame is also very instructive with regard to 
transitional justice.  Jaya Ramji-Nogales has used this frame when 
discussing the need to incorporate local preference and indigenous 
institutions into a pluralist transitional justice design.53  She believes, 
as I do, that “competing visions of substantive justice will exist 
within the affected society and the international community” and 
that transitional justice design should aim to “incorporate, or at least 
respond to, a variety of perspectives.”54 Similarly, using the transi-
tional justice experiences of Argentina and Chile as examples, Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow asserts that transitioning societies are not homo-
geneous and so employing pluralist processes, which provide for 
different and simultaneous models of transitional justice, would 
best account for diverse conditions on the ground.55  Building on this 
point, I contend that in order to encapsulate all of these competing 
instincts and impetuses as democratically as possible, transitional 
justice should be inherently multifaceted and a blend of global and 
local.  The transitional justice process typically involves a variety of 
local, national, and international actors all seeking to redress the vi-
olence and human rights abuses that occurred during periods of 
armed conflict, civil strife, and repression.  Adopting a pluralist ap-
proach to transitional justice takes the emphasis off prioritizing one 
actor over another, which has been the primary focus of the litera-
ture on the truth versus justice debate and sequencing.  Instead of 
trying to determine an optimal order for transitional justice mecha-
nisms, it places the focus on  developing a set of principles and legal 
                                               
 51 Id. at 235 (“[I]n a world of plural normative assertions, one crucial question 
will be whether the community’s articulation of norms is sufficiently persuasive to 
convince those wielding coercive power to enforce such norms.”). 
 52 Id. at 234. 
 53 Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Designing Bespoke Transitional Justice: A Pluralist Process 
Approach, 32 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 7 (2010).  
 54 Id. at 4–5. 
 55 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Process Pluralism in Transitional/Restorative Justice: 
Lessons from Dispute Resolution for Cultural Variations in Goals Beyond Rule of Law and 
Democracy Development in Argentina and Chile, 3 INT'L J. CONFLICT ENGAGEMENT AND 
RESOL. 1, 24 (2015). 
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rules that facilitate their operation in practice.  
Not only is this an important theoretical shift, but practically, it 
has a leveling, perhaps even democratizing, effect.  After mass atroc-
ity, victims have different methods of healing and reintegrating back 
into society.  It is unlikely that any one mechanism would be enough 
to satisfy all victims’ desires for justice and thereby promote recon-
ciliation.  This is because what reconciliation and justice mean is 
highly dependent on who is answering the question.  Reconciliation 
is a difficult concept to nail down because it can occur on so many 
different levels.56  At the micro level, reconciliation can occur be-
tween a perpetrator and a victim, or even within a perpetrator’s own 
conscience.57  At the macro level, it could mean reconciliation be-
tween the victim community and the state that targeted it, or, alter-
natively, the civilian bystanders who were complicit in crimes.58 
Similarly, justice in the transitional context evades definition.59  
It can mean “many things to many survivors: for some it may be 
criminal trials of political leaders, for others punishment of their 
neighbor who killed a family member is most important, and some 
may find justice in being able to return to one’s home and live in 
peace.”60  In Guatemala, there are survivors who support criminal 
                                               
 56 John D. Ciorciari & Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Lessons from the Cambodian Experi-
ence with Truth and Reconciliation, 19 BUFFALO HUM. RTS. L. REV. 193, 196 (2013) (“Rec-
onciliation also lends itself to numerous definitions that vary and even compete 
along several axes, including goals, subject, and scope.”); ROHT-ARRIAZA, 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 1, at 12 (“Definitions 
of reconciliation are still contested and murky, and the individual, community, and 
polity aspects of such processes are still not well understood.”); Susan Kemp, The 
Inter-Relationship between the Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification and the 
Search for Justice in National Courts 73, in TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND COURTS, supra note 
6, at 73. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 See Roman David, What We Know about Transitional Justice: Survey and Exper-
imental Evidence, 38 ADVANCES IN POL. PSYCHOL. 151, 171 (2017) (“Research consist-
ently shows that the meaning of justice in postconflict societies is a broad social 
category that goes beyond the notion of legal justice. In particular, the meaning of 
justice for victims includes individual, social, and political aspects of justice.”); See, 
e.g., Michael Bratton, Violence, Partisanship and Transitional Justice in Zimbabwe, 49 J. 
OF MOD. AFR. STUD. 353, 365 (2011) (asking the meaning of justice, respondents to a 
survey conducted in Zimbabwe indicated that it meant fair treatment (38%), truth 
telling, openness and transparency (17%), equality of socio-economic living stand-
ards (14%), and the rule of law (6%), while 19% of those surveyed said that they did 
not know). 
 60 Laurel E. Fletcher, Institutions from Above and Voices from Below: A Comment 
on Challenges to Group-Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation, 72 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
51, 54 (2009). 
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sanctions for those responsible and others who do not.61  This differ-
ence may affect the healing process.  According to empirical evi-
dence, testifying in a public forum is healing for some survivors, but 
not others.62  Thus, I argue that, in order to incorporate all of these 
differing perspectives, transitional justice should be inherently 
multi-faceted. We should embrace pluralization of transitional jus-
tice and, as Jaya Ramji-Nogales has argued, design systems that plan 
for it, not only because it is inevitable, but also because it is desirable.  
The legal pluralist frame also helps take the focus off another 
dichotomy that frequently appears in the literature: the relative mer-
its of international versus national interventions. This recurring de-
bate in the field centers on what role international actors should play 
in transitional justice, which inevitably raises questions of what def-
erence should be given to a sovereign’s decision to devise its own 
transitional justice design. In other words, how universal is the no-
tion that grave crimes warrant prosecution, regardless of its effect 
on the political compromises made by the governing authorities to 
achieve peace? When is it appropriate for the international commu-
nity to step in with its own legal responses following mass atrocity? 
The Universalist would say that we must strive to keep our systems 
as uniform as possible and that this is best accomplished at the in-
ternational level.63  The Sovereigntist would object, claiming that 
this undermines the autonomy of nation-states, which is the foun-
dation of our global legal order.64  
Neither of these solutions is entirely satisfactory in transitioning 
societies.  Requiring that all transitional justice be done at the inter-
national level so that it is uniform is neither practicable nor desira-
ble, especially at this moment, when international criminal justice is 
facing its own crisis of confidence.  In the last few years, the Interna-
tional Criminal Court has been accused of biased case selection, par-
ticularly by African nations.  These critiques crescendoed in 2016 
when the African Union began to develop a strategy for “collective 
                                               
 61 Interview with Alejandro Rodriguez, Human Rights Attorney, Impunity 
Watch (Aug. 2, 2016) (“Hay víctimas que no están de acuerdo con una sanción, otras 
sí.”). 
 62 See ROHT-ARRIAZA, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, su-
pra note 1, at 5. 
 63 Berman, supra note 15, at 1165 (“Universalists, for their part, will chafe at 
the idea that international norms should ever be subordinated to local practices that 
may be less liberal or less rights-protecting.”). 
 64 Id. (“Sovereigntists will object to the idea that nation-states should ever take 
into account international, transnational, or non-state norms.”). 
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withdrawal from the ICC.”65  Moreover, even if it were desirable for 
international criminal tribunals to be the main arena for prosecu-
tions for crimes associated with mass atrocity, they currently lack 
the capacity to do so.66  Indeed, in its sixteen years of operation, the 
International Criminal Court has only convicted four defendants.67  
Such a requirement would also conflict with the principle of com-
plementarity, which provides that when justice can be done at the 
local level, it should be.68  
Alternatively, relying exclusively on local jurisdictions to prose-
cute crimes in which state actors or institutions may be implicated 
at the highest levels may result in unequal punishment and even 
impunity, as it did for many years in Guatemala.  Indeed, one em-
pirical study that examined seven post-conflict countries found that 
domestic criminal prosecutions only progressed when there was in-
tense UN involvement, regardless of whether they had strong or 
weak internal legal systems.69   
As Naomi Roht-Arriaza aptly put it, “two dimensions—na-
tional/international, or truth commission/trial—are no longer 
enough to map the universe of transitional justice efforts.”70  As my 
research suggests, in post-conflict societies, norms are shared and 
diffused across a multiplicity of actors, be they truth commissions, 
the national judiciary, the international community, or various 
                                               
 65 African Union Assembly Dec. 590(XXVI), A.U. Doc. EX.CL/952(XXVIII), 
Decision on the International Criminal Court, at ¶ 10(iv) (Jan. 30, 2016), 
https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/29514-assembly_au_dec_588_-
_604_xxvi_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8TJ-SMV9]. 
 66 See Ramji-Nogales, supra note 53, at 7 (describing international criminal 
courts incapability of trying “every individual who committed a crime in a situation 
of mass violence”). 
 67 The International Criminal Court has only convicted three defendants and 
acquitted two. For more information about these cases, see Defendants, INT’L. CRIM. 
CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/cases.aspx. 
 68 See Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. 
REV. 429, 497 (2003) (explaining that “under the principle of complementarity, the 
court must defer to national courts unless they are unable or unwilling to prose-
cute.”); See also Darryl Robinson, The Mysterious Mysteriousness of Complementarity, 
21 CRIM. L. F. 67, 72–81 (2010) (explaining that the text of Article 17 requires a two-
step test and that the first step—the so-called “proceedings requirement” —is an 
examination into whether a State is currently investigating or prosecuting the case 
or has already done so). 
 69 Fletcher, et al., supra note 4, at 195 (“Only in countries with weak legal sys-
tems and intense UN involvement are criminal justice proceedings being instituted 
against a limited set of perpetrators.”). 
 70 ROHT-ARRIAZA, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra 
note 1, at 11. 
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actors in civil society.  Empirical research suggests that we should 
embrace this reality.  A recent study that examined the sequencing 
of transitional justice mechanisms in Latin America found little evi-
dence that there is one “optimal sequence” to promote democracy.71  
Moreover, research in the political science arena has found that 
“none of the transitional justice mechanisms on their own reduce 
human rights violations or improve democracy.”72  Rather, only 
combinations of transitional justice mechanisms have been found to 
affect human rights and democracy positively.73  The only conclu-
sive finding across studies is that criminal trials, when combined 
with other mechanisms like amnesties and truth commissions, are 
democracy-promoting, meaning that “successful democratic consol-
idation is almost never observed where trials have not been con-
ducted.”74  
While quantitative analysis of the effects of various combina-
tions of transitional justice mechanisms on democracy and human 
rights is now commonplace, at least among political scientists, how 
such blending of mechanisms contributes to these long-term out-
comes in practice has been undertheorized. Emerging scholarship 
that addresses this trend has tended to focus on whether the various 
sequencing of these mechanisms affect long-term outcomes, such as 
democratic consolidation and sustained peace, but not on how their 
interaction in practice might contribute to these goals.75 The scholar-
ship that has focused on the relationship between truth commissions 
and trials have primarily focused on the few countries where they 
occurred simultaneously.76  Much less has been written about how 
truth commissions and trials that are sequenced have been comple-
mentary in practice.77  Scholars have missed opportunities to 
                                               
 71 Dancy & Wiebelhaus-Brahm, supra note 5, at 332 (“In a crude sense, this 
suggests that there is not an optimal timing or sequencing of [transitional justice] 
needed to promote democratic development.”). 
 72  Olsen, Payne & Reiter, supra note 11, at 996. 
 73 Id.  
 74 Dancy & Wiebelhaus-Brahm, supra note 5, at 340. 
 75 Skaar et. al., supra note 12, at 28. 
 76 William A. Schabas, A Synergistic Relationship: The Sierra Leone Truth and Rec-
onciliation Commission and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 15 CRIM. L. F. 3, 3–6 (2004) 
(focusing on the example of Sierra Leone).  
 77 Skaar, et. al., supra note 12, at 28.  But see Eduardo González Cueva, The 
Contribution of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission to Prosecutions, in 
TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND COURTS, supra note 6, at 55, 59–66 (2004) (highlighting the 
cooperation between Peruvian truth commissions and the court system).  See also 
Susan Kemp, The Inter-Relationship between the Guatemalan Commission for Historical 
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innovate systems that account for the pluralization of transitional 
justice, and thus more effectively address the unique challenges that 
transitioning societies face when trying to overcome their troubled 
pasts. 
This article attempts to fill this gap by drawing lessons from the 
Guatemalan experience with transitional justice.  Guatemala pro-
vides a compelling illustration of the promise that more integrated 
and pluralist transitional justice systems might hold.  Although 
scholars mistakenly portray Guatemala as a country where truth 
commissions preceded trials,78 as my research reveals, trials oc-
curred prior to, concurrently with, and after the work of the truth 
commissions.  This makes it an interesting case study to explore the 
various ways that trials and truth commissions might complement 
each other in practice.  My research suggests that the operation of 
multiple legal or quasi-legal institutions can be particularly advan-
tageous as a tool for liberalization, in that it can open up “spaces of 
resistance” to counter the official state narrative or to disrupt a cor-
rupt legal system.79  Furthermore, in lieu of imposing international 
law on transitional countries through a positivist legal order at the 
international level, allowing for norm diffusion through and across 
various institutions is more likely to yield liberalizing results locally. 
 
3.  TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN GUATEMALA 
 
In order to contextualize my later findings, a baseline under-
standing of the Guatemalan internal armed conflict and the transi-
tional justice mechanisms set up to address atrocities committed 
during that period is essential.  Although there were many causes of 
the internal armed conflict in Guatemala, any analysis of it would 
be incomplete without placing it within the broader context of the 
Cold War.80  In 1953, then President Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán ushered 
                                               
Clarification and the Search for Justice in National Courts, in TRUTH COMMISSIONS & 
COURTS, supra note 6, at 67, 74 (2004) (considering the relationship between truth 
commissions and criminal prosecutions). 
 78 See, e.g., Dukalskis, supra note 22, at 440 (stating that Guatemala conducted 
a sequence of truth commissions followed by prosecutions); see also Fletcher et al., 
supra note 4, at 215 (stating that Guatemala “opted for truth commissions rather 
than trials”). 
 79 Berman, supra note 15, at 1176. 
 80 See Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, Guatemala: Memoria Del Si-
lencio, Capítulo primero: Causas y Orígenes del Enfrentamiento Armado Interno 98 (1999) 
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in a wave of agrarian reforms in an effort to redistribute land.81  One 
of his most controversial measures was to expropriate land that re-
mained uncultivated. When Arbenz sought to repatriate land 
owned by the United Fruit Company, a US-owned banana com-
pany, the United States, who with the backdrop of the Cold War was 
predisposed to view Arbenz as a communist, began a covert CIA 
operation to overthrow his government.82  In 1954, Carlos Castillo 
Armas and a small army, who were trained by the CIA, led an inva-
sion into the capital of Guatemala. While the attack objectively was 
not a military success, it did succeed in putting enough pressure on 
Arbenz that he ultimately resigned that year and a military govern-
ment took over.83  
Thereafter, the Guatemalan government instituted the National 
Security Doctrine, a repressive anti-communist agenda developed 
primarily in the United States that targeted the “internal enemy.”84  
It was in this context that groups of leftist Guatemalans mobilized, 
culminating in a failed uprising of leftist military officers on Novem-
ber 13, 1960.85  This date is seen as the start of Guatemala’s internal 
armed conflict.  
Although the political and military might of the guerilla groups 
was limited, the State viewed this armed insurgency as a fundamen-
tal threat to their moderation project and so responded with brutal 
force.  At the time of the civil war, Guatemala was one of only a 
handful of countries in Latin America to have an indigenous major-
ity population and the government believed that this population 
was stalling the country’s economic development.86  The Guatema-
lan government saw only two possibilities for the indigenous Ma-
yan population: assimilation or elimination.  This was confirmed by 
the documents collected by the CEH.  Otilia Lux de Cotí, one of the 
three Commissioners of the CEH, explained to me that the CEH dis-
covered correspondence dating as far back as the 1970s, containing 
“assertions that the ‘indian’ is an element that does not permit de-
velopment and that should either mix to become mestizo or be 
                                               
[hereinafter CEH Report] (discussing the historical background that set the context 
for the Guatemalan internal armed conflict). 
 81 Id. at 101–02. 
 82 Stephen Schlesinger & Stephen Kinzer, BITTER FRUIT: THE STORY OF THE 
AMERICAN COUP IN GUATEMALA (1999). 
 83 Id.  
 84 CEH Report, supra note 80, at 117–123. 
 85 Id. at 123. 
 86 Id. at 79. 
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eliminated.”87  During the 1980s, considered the bloodiest period of 
the conflict, the Guatemalan government, led by military strong-
men, developed the so-called scorched earth campaign, in which 
they razed entire villages and killed tens of thousands of people.88  
The conflict continued until 1996 when the Guatemalan Govern-
ment and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) 
signed the Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace (Acuerdo de Paz 
Firme and Duradera).89 
 
3.1.  The Commission for Historical Clarification  
 
After considering the various options for how to address the 
mass human rights violations that occurred during the armed con-
flict, Guatemala opted for amnesty and a truth commission.90  Alt-
hough, under the national reconciliation law, amnesty did not exist 
for international grave crimes such as genocide, torture, and forced 
disappearances, many people still saw it as fostering impunity.91  In 
addition, many human rights advocates viewed the truth commis-
sion as an inadequate substitute for justice.92  Describing the truth 
commission as a “piñata of forgiving,” Francisco Goldman, a Guate-
malan writer, put into words the feelings of many at the time: that 
the peace agreement and accompanying amnesties were a surrender 
made by ladinos rather than the true victims of the armed conflict, 
                                               
 87 Interview with Otilia Lux de Cotí, CEH Commissioner (Dec. 13, 2017) 
(“Existían comunicados de los años 70 que contenían afirmaciones como ‘el indio’ 
es un elemento que no permite el desarrollo de Guatemala, el cual debe mezclarse 
y convertirse en mestizo, o debe eliminarse.”)   
 88 PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE 
CHALLENGE OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 32 (Routledge ed., 2nd ed. 2011). 
 89 Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace, Guat.-URNG, Dec. 29, 1996, 36 
I.L.M. 274. 
 90 HAYNER, supra note 88, at 32. 
 91 National Reconciliation Law, Article 8, Decreto numero 145-1996, Dec. 27, 
1996; Interview with Naomi Roht-Arriaza (Nov. 14, 2017). 
 92 Jemima García-Godos & Luis Raúl Salvado, Guatemala: Truth and Memory on 
Trial, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN LATIN AMERICA: THE UNEVEN ROAD FROM IMPUNITY 
TOWARDS ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 12, at 205 (“[T]he insurgency gradually lost 
popular support in the course of the negotiations, in part because the accords it 
signed were widely perceived as weak in their response to popular demands for 
justice… The accord [which created the CEH] generated disillusionment within so-
cial movements and the human rights sector for its provision that ‘the Commission 
shall not attribute responsibility to any individual in its work, recommendations 
and report nor shall these have any judicial aim or effect . . .”). 
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the indigenous Mayan population.93  As he put it, “[t]he Guatemalan 
Armed Forces and the guerrillas have negotiated a law forgiving 
themselves for 36 years of crimes that sear the heart and stupefy the 
mind, and are asking their fellow citizens to believe that this is the 
gateway to the rule of law in a new democratic society.”94 
The resulting UN-backed truth commission, the Commission for 
the Historical Clarification (or CEH, for its Spanish acronym), was 
established by a peace agreement between the Guatemalan military 
government and the guerilla that was reached in Oslo on June 23, 
1994.95  In the preamble of the agreement, the parties recognized that 
“the people of Guatemala have a right to know the whole truth con-
cerning these events, clarification of which will help avoid a repeti-
tion of these sad and painful events and strengthen the process of 
democratization in Guatemala.”96  The agreement specified that its 
goal was to clarify objectively, equally, and impartially the human 
rights violations and the acts of violence that caused the suffering of 
the Guatemalan population during the armed conflict.97  It would 
also formulate “recommendations that will facilitate peace and na-
tional harmony in Guatemala,” in particular by suggesting 
measures to preserve the memory of the victims, fostering a culture 
of mutual respect, and strengthening the democratic process.98  It 
“was not instituted to judge, which is the role of the tribunals, but 
instead to clarify the history of what occurred during more than 
three decades of fratricidal war.”99  The agreement also specified 
that the work of the CEH would begin with the signing of the Agree-
ment on a Firm and Lasting Peace and would continue for six 
months with a possibility to extend for six months more if the CEH 
wished.100  Due to the extensive investigative period and the 
                                               
 93 Francisco Goldman, In Guatemala, All is Forgotten, NY TIMES (Dec. 23, 1996) 
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/23/opinion/in-guatemala-all-is-forgot-
ten.html [https://perma.cc/XRB6-MXBK]. 
 94 Id.  
 95 CEH Report, supra note 80, at 15. 
 96 Agreement on the Establishment of the Commission to Clarify Past Human 
Rights Violations and Acts of Violence that have Caused the Guatemalan Popula-
tion to Suffer, June 23, 1994, UN Doc. A/48/954/S/1994/751, Annex II, Preamble, 
¶ 2, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peace-
maker.un.org/files/GT_940623_EstablishmentCommissionClarifyPastHumanRig
htsViolations.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8R3-S9F7] [hereinafter Oslo Accord]. 
 97 CEH Report, supra note 80, at 15. 
 98 Id. at 24.  
 99 Id. at 15. 
 100 Oslo Accord, supra note 96, at 2.  
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territorial and social complexities in which the CEH had to work, 
the CEH decided to extend its work for the additional six months 
allowed by the Oslo Agreement.101  
The agreement further specified that the CEH “could not indi-
vidualize responsibility or have judicial goals or effects.”102  The 
CEH interpreted this provision to mean that the CEH was only 
meant to clarify history and not to serve as or to take the place of a 
criminal proceeding.103  Furthermore, after examining the “literal, 
historical, teleological, and systematic interpretation of the term ‘to 
not individualize responsibility,’” the CEH concluded that it did not 
have the authority to identify the names of those responsible for hu-
man rights violations.104  For that reason, the CEH did not name 
names of individuals in the text of the report; however it did attrib-
ute institutional responsibility for grave crimes.105  At the same time, 
the CEH concluded that, even though it was not a judicial body and 
its conclusions did not have legal effect, nothing prevented the Gua-
temalan government, particularly its judicial system, from relying 
on the information contained in the report.106  The report further 
stipulated that citizens, including victims and their family members, 
had the right to bring legal actions in relation to the case studies de-
scribed in the report.107 
 
3.1.1.  The Composition of the CEH 
 
The Oslo Agreement provided that the CEH would have three 
members: 1) the moderator of the peace negotiations, 2) a Guatema-
lan citizen of “irreproachable conduct,” and 3) an academic pro-
posed by the university rectors.108  In the end, the moderator of the 
peace negotiations persuaded Christian Tomuschat, who was the 
rapporteur of the UN Human Rights Commission on the human 
rights situation in Guatemala from 1990 to 1993, to take his place as 
                                               
 101 CEH Report, supra note 80, at 41. 
 102 Id. at 24 (“[L]os trabajos, recomendaciones e informe de la Comisión no 
individualizaran responsabilidades, ni tendrán efectos o propósitos judiciales.”). 
 103 Id. at 42. 
 104 Id. at 44. 
 105 Id. 
 106  Id.  
 107  Id.  
 108  Oslo Accord, supra note 96, at 2. 
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the only foreign Commissioner on the CEH.109  In addition to these 
three Commissioners, the CEH had a staff of 273 professional, in-
cluding 142 Guatemalans and 131 from other countries.110  
The CEH adopted a strategy of “territorial deployment,” by es-
tablishing offices in the interior of the country and prioritizing those 
areas most affected by the armed conflict, in order to make it easier 
for Guatemalans to access their office and to give testimony.111  In 
total, the CEH established four sub-headquarters and ten regional 
offices.112  From the regional offices, the CEH investigators would 
travel to the municipalities and communities of every department of 
the country in order to inform them directly or indirectly (through 
NGOs, formal officials, and traditional leaders) about the mandate 
of the CEH.113  
In total, CEH investigators visited 2,000 communities, collected 
500 collective testimonies, and registered 7,338 individual testimo-
nies.114  The CEH promised everyone who spoke with them that they 
would not reveal their identities.115  According to Denis Martinez, 
who was an employee of the CEH, there was a standard script for 
each interview that detailed what the CEH was, its purpose, the 
guarantee of confidentiality, and that participation was voluntary 
and not compensated.116  He also relayed that the questions they 
asked resembled what the Attorney General’s office uses today to 
document an alleged criminal incident.117  It included sections for 
consent, general demographic information about the declarant, such 
as where they were born and their age, and the complete infor-
mation about the criminal incident, including the date of the inci-
dent, the victims, what violation occurred (e.g. rape, extrajudicial 
killing, torture, etc.), and who they believed was responsible.118  This 
information was then inputted into a database, which the American 
                                               
 109  Interview with Christian Tomuschat, UN Human Rights Commission 
Rapporteur (Oct. 11, 2016). 
 110  CEH Report, supra note 80, at 31. 
 111  Id. at 32. 
 112  Id. 
 113  Id. at 32–33. 
 114  CEH Report, supra note 80, at 33. 
 115  Interview with Christian Tomuschat, supra note 109.  
 116  Interview with Denis Martinez, CEH employee (Aug. 12, 2016). 
 117  Id. (“[E]ra un formulario similar a los que utiliza el Ministerio Público para 
documentar un incidente.”) 
 118  Interview with Denis Martinez, supra note 116; see also CEH Report, supra 
note 80, at ¶ 188. 
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Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), at the CEH’s 
request, later analyzed to come up with specific statistics for each 
violation.119  Their methodology is detailed in the annex of the CEH.  
Sociologists and other non-lawyers complained that the interview 
process was so rigid that it did not permit them to document the 
voices of the people.120  Another challenge reported to me was that 
the Mayan translators did not have any formal training in transla-
tion, which complicated the interview process.121 
In order to ensure the confidentiality of those who gave testi-
mony, the CEH coded all of its interviews so that each interview was 
assigned a unique number and all identifying information was re-
moved from the interview notes.122  For this reason, the CEH also 
decided to send its archives to the UN headquarters in New York 
City.123  The CEH estimated that it collaborated with more than 
20,000 individuals who provided information to the CEH, including 
more than 1,000 “key witnesses,” who were members of the military, 
members of the civil defense patrols (or PACs, as they are known by 
their Spanish acronym), military commissioners, politicians, com-
batants in the guerrilla, intellectuals, labor leaders, and members of 
civil society.124  However, according to Christian Tomuschat, none 
of the alleged perpetrators came forward to testify.125  At the same 
time, he and Otilia Lux both said that they had a lengthy interview, 
lasting three or four hours, with Benedicto Lucas García, the former 
chief of staff of the military during the worst periods of the conflict 
who is currently on trial for enforced disappearance in the 
CREOMPAZ case and was recently convicted of crimes against hu-
manity, aggravated sexual assault, and enforced disappearance in 
the Molina Theissen case.126  However, he evaded all of their ques-
tions.127 
                                               
 119  Interview with Denis Martinez, supra note 116 (explaining that instead of 
inputting names of those responsible, the statisticians inputted what group they 
belonged to, such as the military, para-military, special forces, etc.). 
 120  Interview with Denis Martinez, supra note 116 (“La queja de los sociólogos 
o los que no eran abogados, era que no permitía documentar las palabras de la 
gente…”) 
 121  Id. 
 122  Id. 
 123  CEH Report, supra note 80, at 33. 
 124  Id. at 33–34. 
 125  Interview with Christian Tomuschat, supra note 109.  
 126  Id; Interview with Otilia Lux de Cotí, supra note 87. 
 127  Id. 
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The CEH also consulted thousands of pages of documents sub-
mitted by diverse organizations from civil society, including mili-
tary documents that the United States government had declassi-
fied.128  Christian Tomuschat explained that the Commission had 
also asked the Guatemalan Government to access its military ar-
chives, but the military forces “lied blatantly, saying that there were 
no archives at all. It came out later that there were so many docu-
ments.”129  In his view, the Guatemalan Government did not actively 
obstruct the work, but did not cooperate with the CEH.130  
According to its report, the CEH’s principal purpose was “to cre-
ate a record of the recent bloody past of Guatemala.”131  The CEH 
hoped that “the truth would lead to reconciliation, and that, in fact, 
confronting the truth is an essential step to arriving at reconcilia-
tion.”132  Moreover, it said, “knowing the truth about what hap-
pened would make it easier to achieve national reconciliation, so 
that Guatemalans could in the future live in an authentic democracy, 
without forgetting that the rule of law has been and continues to be 
the primary demand to create a new state.”133  The report also un-
derscored that “[r]econciliation is not possible without justice.”134  
The Oslo Agreement did not itself make reference to reparations 
or assistance to the victims.135  However, the “Acuerdo sobre Bases 
para la Incorporacion de la URNG a la Legalidad” in paragraph 19 es-
tablished that the entity in charge of reparations and assistance to 
victims should “take into account the recommendations formulated 
by the CEH.”136 
 
3.1.2.  The Judicial Foundation used by the CEH 
 
The CEH took the reference to human rights in the Oslo Agree-
ment to mean international human rights norms, commenting that 
                                               
 128  CEH Report, supra note 80, at 16. 
 129  Interview with Christian Tomuschat, supra note 109. 
 130  Id.  
 131  CEH Report, supra note 80, at 16. (“El propósito principal del Informe es 
dejar constancia del reciente pasado sangriento de Guatemala.”) 
 132  Id.  
 133  Id.  
 134  Id. at 17. 
 135  Id. at 43. 
 136  Id. 
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“it is only through international rules and principles that we are able 
to measure objectively the distortions and perversions suffered by 
the national legal order, at least partially, under different military 
governments.”137  It therefore based its findings on the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which it considered customary inter-
national law, as well as international treaties, including the Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
which was in force during the armed conflict.138  In addition, alt-
hough the Oslo Agreement did not mention international humani-
tarian law, the CEH believed that it applied because its aim is to pro-
tect human rights in wartime.139  Specifically, the CEH concluded 
that Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 ap-
plied to both the military and the guerilla groups.140  More contro-
versially, the CEH found that the Additional Protocol II, which Gua-
temala had only ratified in 1987 and insisted did not apply, was 
enforceable because its rules formed a part of customary interna-
tional law.141  The CEH also took into account national law, particu-
lar the various Constitutions in effect during the internal armed con-
flict, finding that the Guatemalan government violated its duty to 
respect and protect the right to life either through its direct action or 
with its knowledge and acquiescence.142 
The CEH registered 42,275 victims, of whom over 23,000 were 
victims of arbitrary executions and over 6,000 were victims of disap-
pearances.143  Of those registered victims, 83% were Mayan and 17% 
were Ladino.144  Overall, the CEH estimated that over 200,000 people 
were killed during the armed conflict, around 90 percent of them by 
the military.145  It also estimated that there were around 40,000 
                                               
 137  Id. at 45. 
 138  Id.  Guatemala ratified the Genocide Convention in 1950, before the armed 
conflict began.  Convention On The Prevention And Punishment Of The Crime Of 
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, https://treaties.un.org/doc/publica-
tion/unts/volume%2078/volume-78-i-1021-english.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9J4-
D3W3]. 
 139  CEH Report, supra note 80, at ¶¶ 71–72. 
 140  Id. at 46, ¶¶ 73 & 75 
 141  Id. at ¶ 74.  
 142  Id. at 46-47, ¶¶ 77 & 78. 
 143  Id. at 21 (Conclusiones y Recomendaciones, Capítulo cuarto: Conclusio-
nes). 
 144  Id.  
 145  Id. at 16 (Capítulo segundo: Las violaciones de los derechos humanos y los 
hechos de violencia). 
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victims of enforced disappearance.146  The CEH also concluded that 
the military committed “genocidal acts” in four specific areas, in-
cluding the Ixil region.147  It further concluded that the majority of 
atrocities were perpetrated in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
In February 1999, the CEH publicly presented its report to ap-
proximately 10,000 people who attended a grand ceremony in Gua-
temala City.  When the head of the CEH, Christian Tomuchat, an-
nounced its finding that the majority of human rights violations 
were committed by national security forces, the audience began to 
chant: “Justice! Justice!”148  Upon hearing the CEH’s conclusion, Ál-
varo Arzú, the President of Guatemala at that time who was sup-
posed to receive the report, excused himself from his table and left 
the ceremony without formally accepting the report.149  About a 
week later, the government took out advertisements in various news 
outlets disputing that the CEH report represented the true story of 
the armed conflict.150  
 
3.2.  The Catholic Church’s Recovery of Historical Memory Project  
 
The CEH built off the work of the Recovery of Historical 
Memory Project of the Catholic Church’s Human Rights Office 
(REMHI), an effort begun by the Human Rights Office of the Guate-
malan Archbishop (or ODHAG for its acronym in Spanish), which 
was created in October of 1994, the same year that CEH received its 
mandate from the United Nations.151  ODHAG created REMHI in 
part due to the skepticism about CEH from human rights activists 
and the founder of ODHAG, Bishop Juan Gerardi, who believed that 
the CEH would not go far enough since its mandate explicitly pro-
hibited it from assigning guilt to perpetrators and from having “any 
                                               
 146  Id. at 73 (Mandato y Procedimiento de Trabajo). 
 147  Id. 
 148  Se presenta informe Guatemala, memoria del silencio en 1999, PRENSA LIBRE 
(Feb. 26, 1999), http://www.prensalibre.com/hemeroteca/se-presenta-informe-
guatemala-memoria-del-silencio-en-1999. 
 149  Id. 
 150  García-Godos & Raúl Salvado, Guatemala: Truth and Memory on Trial, supra 
note 92, at 208. 
 151  HAYNER, supra note 88, at 33–34 (noting that REMHI collected thousands 
of statements through trained local interviewers); RECUPERACIÓN DE LA MEMORIA 
HISTÓRICA, OFICINA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS DEL ARZOBISPADO DE GUATEMALA, 
GUATEMALA: NUNCA MÁS 19 (1998) [hereinafter REMHI Report]. 
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judicial aim or effect.”152  The directors hoped that REMHI, which 
did not have the same time constraints as CEH and was able to name 
names, could lay the groundwork for CEH to be more effective in its 
work.153  According to the leadership of REMHI, who I interviewed, 
REMHI was also meant to be a resource for victims who wanted to 
bring cases (though some of the human rights attorneys I inter-
viewed were unaware of this objective).154  However, at the time, 
Edgar Gutierrez, the General Coordinator of REMHI, did not believe 
that justice would ever be possible.155  
Despite this internal objective, externally, REMHI was portrayed 
as a historical preservation project.  Indeed, in the introduction to 
REMHI, the Archbishop of Guatemala at the time, Monsignor Pros-
pero Penados del Barrios, stated that its official purpose was “to pre-
serve the historical memory of political violence and document the 
gravest violations of human rights of people and indigenous com-
munities during the thirty-six year fratricidal conflict, which pro-
duced extreme social polarization.”156  The project was designed to 
create a space, even if limited, where those who gave their testimony 
could feel recognized and supported.157  Everything from how the 
interviews were conducted to the training of the interviewers and 
the instruments used to gather information were devised to facilitate 
that goal.158 
                                               
 152  See FRANCISCO GOLDMAN, THE ART OF POLITICAL MURDER 5 (2007) (describ-
ing Bishop Gerardi’s skepticism towards the UN Historical Clarification Commis-
sion). See also Oslo Accord, supra note 96, at 2. (“Los trabajos, recomendaciones e 
informe de la Comisión no individualizarán responsabilidades, ni tendrán 
propósitos o efectos judiciales.”); Interview with Edgar Gutiérrez, General 
Coordinator of REMHI (July 25, 2016). 
 153  Interview with Edgar Gutiérrez, supra note 152; Interview with a Diocese 
Coordinator of REMHI who wishes to remain anonymous (July 27, 2016) (Record-
ing of interview on file with author). 
 154  Interview with Edgar Gutiérrez, supra note 152; Interview with a Diocese 
Coordinator of REMHI, supra note 153; Interview with Mynor Alvarado, Legal Di-
rector of Grupo Apoyo Mutuo (Aug. 17, 2016) (Recording of interview on file with 
author). 
 155  Interview with Edgar Gutiérrez, supra note 152. 
 156  REMHI Report, supra note 151, at 19 (“. . . preservar la memoria histórica 
sobra la violencia política, las gravísimas violaciones a los derechos humanos de las 
personas y comunidades indígenas durante estos treinta y seis anos de lucha 
fratricida que produjo una polarización social sin limites.”) 
 157  Id. at 23 (“La conducción de las entrevistas, la preparación de los 
animadores y el uso de los instrumentos de recogida de información se orientaron 
a tratar de generar un espacio que, aunque limitado, supusiera un reconocimiento 
y apoyo para los declarantes.”) 
 158  Id.  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
  
778 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 39:3 
REMHI was staffed by pastoral teams from eleven dioceses 
(with one declining to participate) that focused mainly on the rural 
areas of the country, which were isolated due to the limited access 
to modes of communication and the diverse Mayan languages spo-
ken there.159  Its link to the Catholic Church was essential to its suc-
cess.160  Mayan Guatemalans, deeply fearful of outsiders, especially 
after the extreme repression and violence of the armed conflict, 
trusted the church because it was already established in their com-
munities and had been a safe haven for many during the worst years 
of the war.161  This was crucial because REMHI collected its testi-
mony at a time when political tension was still high and both mili-
tary and paramilitary forces were still active.162  Indeed, some of the 
people interviewed did not know that the armed conflict had 
ended.163 
In the central office, REMHI had five research teams, each with 
a different theme or focus, including socio-psychological, cultural, 
gender, legal and social historical.164  Over two years, REMHI 
trained six to eight hundred people in how to interview and collect 
testimony.165  The interviewers were people from the local commu-
nities where they worked and were selected by representatives from 
the communities and religious sectors.166  The selection criteria for 
the position included the ability to listen and communicate, having 
the trust and recognition of the community, and dedication to con-
fidentiality and continuity of the work.167 
The interviewers worked out of thirteen regional centers and 
conducted over half of their interviews in fifteen different Maya 
                                               
 159  Id. at 19; GOLDMAN, supra note 152, at 7. 
 160  REMHI Report, supra note 151, at 21. 
 161  Id. 
 162 REMHI, Metodologia de Investigacion (Apr. 6, 2013), 
http://www.remhi.org.gt/portal/metodologia-de-investigacion/ 
[https://perma.cc/4PA2-KBL5] [hereinafter REMHI Methodology]  
 163  Interview with Edgar Gutiérrez, supra note 152. 
 164  REMHI Methodology, supra note 162. 
 165  HAYNER, supra note 88, at 33–34 (noting that REMHI “collected thousands 
of statements by training over six hundred local interviewers and working through 
church networks”).  But see GOLDMAN, supra note 152, at 6 (describing how accord-
ing to Bishop Geradi, REMHI had trained over 800 people over two years). 
 166  REMHI Methodology, supra note 162. 
 167  Id. (“Entre los criterios de selección estaban: capacidad de escucha y 
comunicación; confianza y reconocimiento de la gente de la comunidad; 
compromiso de confidencialidad y continuidad en el trabajo.”). 
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languages and the rest in Spanish.168  In order to compare the testi-
mony given across the country, the interviewers all asked the same 
seven questions:  
 
1) What happened? 
2) When and where? 
3) Who was responsible?  
4) What effects did the act have in your life?  
5) What did you do to deal with the act?  
6) Why do you think that it happened?; and  
7) What needs to happen in order for the acts not to  
reoccur?169  
 
REHMI collected testimony for six months.  As Edgar Gutiérrez, 
the coordinator of REMHI, explained to me, in smaller villages 
where everyone knows each other, some people did not want their 
community to know that they went to the church to give testi-
mony.170  Therefore, REMHI paid for radio announcements, in 
which they invited witnesses to go to other communities to give 
their testimony.171  These interviews were recorded and/or tran-
scribed and are now available at ODHAG upon request.172  Accord-
ing to all of the former staff of REMHI with whom I spoke, there 
were never any reprisals against people who gave their testimony.173 
Similar to CEH, REMHI also interviewed key witnesses through 
another procedure.174  These people were not necessarily victims; 
                                               
 168  GOLDMAN, supra note 152, at 6.  
 169  REMHI Methodology, supra note 162 (“Para facilitar la comparabilidad de 
los testimonios y la conducción de las entrevistas se estructuró una metodología 
basada en siete preguntas para la recogida de testimonios: ¿qué sucedió?, ¿cuando 
y dónde?, ¿quienes fueron los responsables?, ¿qué efectos tuvo ese hecho en su 
vida?, ¿qué hizo para enfrentarlo?, ¿por qué cree que pasó? y ¿qué habría que hacer 
para que no volviera a suceder?”). 
 170  Interview with Edgar Gutiérrez, supra note 152. 
 171  Id. 
 172  HAYNER, supra note 88, at 34. 
 173  Interview with Edgar Gutiérrez, supra note 152; Interview with a Diocese 
Coordinator of REMHI, supra note 153. 
 174  Interview with Edgar Gutiérrez, supra note 152. 
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instead REMHI sought them out for their knowledge of a commu-
nity, the period when the acts occurred, or the structure of the mili-
tary.175  In some instances, the person interviewed had personal 
knowledge of atrocities committed because they were part of the 
military.176  
Because of the strong desire of the victims to find the remains of 
their relatives who were missing, REMHI created the first forensic 
team to exhume clandestine mass graves in Guatemala.  Since the 
Guatemala government did not have its own forensic team, the At-
torney General’s office signed contracts with organizations like 
ODHAG to gather forensic evidence for its cases.177 
In April 1998, REMHI’s work culminated in the release of Gua-
temala, Nunca Mas!, a four-volume, 1,400 page report that, unlike 
CEH, identified the individuals responsible for mass atrocities.178  
The report named over 50,000 individuals who were killed during 
the armed conflict (representing about a quarter of the total fatali-
ties) and documented 410 massacres.179  It also concluded that the 
majority of the massacres occurred from 1981 to 1983 (though some 
occurred as late as 1995) and that the Guatemalan Army and the 
PACs were responsible for 80% of the killings of civilians whereas 
the guerillas were responsible for less than 5%.180  The REMHI report 
also analyzed the pattern and practice of the crimes committed dur-
ing the war as well as both their immediate and lasting impact on 
individuals and communities.181  Additionally, direct testimony 
from victims and perpetrators from both sides of the conflict regard-
ing human rights violations and their lasting effects of the events 
was described throughout the report.182 
When the report was released, no high level Guatemalan officer 
had been convicted or imprisoned for human rights violations per-
petrated during the war.183  Bishop Gerardi made it clear, however, 
that the evidence REMHI gathered would be available to those 
                                               
 175  Id. 
 176  Id. 
 177  Id. 
 178  GOLDMAN, supra note 152, at 4–5.   
 179  Id. at 22. 
 180  Id. 
 181  REMHI Report, Volume I: Impactos de la Violencia, supra note 151. 
 182  GOLDMAN, supra note 152, at 22. 
 183  Id. at 25. 
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seeking justice against military officials or the guerillas.184  REMHI 
also shared its database with CEH, which it used in its calculations 
to estimate the total numbers of people killed or disappeared and 
confirm overall patterns.185  
Although the heads of REMHI saw the fight for justice as the 
next phase of REMHI and hoped that the dissemination of the report 
would encourage victims to press for trials, the brutal murder of 
Bishop Gerardi the day after the release of the report put a grinding 
halt to those plans for about three years.186  According to Edgar 
Gutiérrez, everyone was scared.187  The victims wondered, if the per-
petrators did that to a bishop, what they would do to them.188 
 
3.3.  Prosecutions of International Crimes in Guatemala and Spain 
 
Although a few low level paramilitary officials were successfully 
convicted, the power that the perpetrators still held in Guatemala, 
formally and informally, caused prosecutions of the high command 
of the army, those who principally planned and organized the mass 
atrocities and other human rights violations, to stall.189  Realizing 
that prosecutions in Guatemala were infeasible, on December 2, 
1999, Nobel Prize winner Rigoberta Menchú filed a complaint with 
the Spanish Audiencia Nacional, using the precedent of a similar case 
against former Chilean President Augusto Pinochet and a Spanish 
statute that provided universal jurisdiction for international grave 
crimes regardless of where they occurred.190  The complaint alleged 
                                               
 184 Id.  
 185 HAYNER, supra note 88, at 34.  For more information about the database, 
see GUATEMALA: NUNCA MAS, http://www.remhi.org.gt/bd/. 
 186 Interview with Edgar Gutiérrez, supra note 152. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. 
 189 Keller, supra note 13, at 297–301; Decreto No. 145, Ley de Reconciliation 
Nacional [National Reconciliation Law], supra note 13; Popkin, supra note 13. 
 190 Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Making the State Do Justice: Transnational Prosecutions 
and International Support for Criminal Investigations in Post-Armed Conflict Guatemala, 
9 CHI. J. INT'L L. 79, 79 n.3 (2008) (“The Audiencia Nacional hears cases involving 
drug smuggling, terrorism, state corruption, and international crimes that cannot 
adequately be dealt with at the level of provinces and autonomous communities.  
Although divided into chambers, it is roughly equivalent to a US district court.”).  
Naomi Roht-Arriaza & Almudena Bernabeu, Many Roads to Justice: Transnational 
Prosecutions and International Support for Criminal Investigations in Post-conflict Gua-
temala, in THE ROLE OF COURTS IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: VOICES FROM LATIN AMERICA 
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that eight former military or government officials, including Efraín 
Ríos Montt and Benedicto Lucas García, were responsible for tor-
ture, genocide, terrorism, assassination, and illegal detention be-
tween 1978 and 1986.191  The criminal acts described in the complaint 
included the bombing of the Spanish Embassy in Guatemala City in 
1980, which killed thirty-seven people, as well as the extrajudicial 
killing of Spanish and other foreign priests and relatives of the com-
plainant, Rigoberta Menchu.  
Manuel Ollé Sese, the lead attorney on the case, told me that he 
was afraid to bring the case in Spain because, at the time, there were 
many judges and prosecutors who wanted to see universal jurisdic-
tion undone.192  At first, he hesitated to be part of the case, because 
he feared that they would use it to do away with universal jurisdic-
tion altogether.193  In the end, it was not Spain who undermined the 
case, but Guatemala.  In a groundbreaking decision in 2005, the 
Spanish Constitutional Court held that its universal jurisdiction stat-
ute granted the Spanish judiciary jurisdiction over international 
crimes even when there was no nexus to Spain.194  Thus, the case 
forged ahead until December 12, 2007, when the Guatemalan Con-
stitutional Court decided that it would not honor the Spanish arrest 
warrants or extradition requests.  The court held that Spanish courts 
did not constitute a “competent authority” because Spain’s effort to 
exercise universal jurisdiction over crimes that occurred in Guate-
mala was unacceptable and an affront to Guatemala's sovereignty.195    
Nonetheless, Guatemalan human rights attorneys continued to 
push ahead with numerous cases against the high command of the 
Guatemalan military in their national courts.  These efforts culmi-
nated in 2012, when Ríos Montt was brought before a Guatemalan 
court on charges of genocide and crimes against humanity for his 
role in the massacre of Ixil villages in 1982.196  This was the first time 
                                               
AND SPAIN 184, 188 (Jessica Almqvist & Carlos Esposito, eds., 2012). 
 191 Guatemalan Generals Case, Complaint filed by Rigoberta Menchú with 
the Juzgado Central de Instrucccion de Guardia de la Audiencia National in Spain, 
Dec. 2, 1999 (on file with author) [hereinafter Spanish Complaint]. 
 192  Interview with Manuel Ollé Sese, Lead Attorney of the Guatemalan Gen-
erals Case (Oct. 26, 2016) (Interview notes on file with author). 
 193 Id.  
 194 Guatemalan Generals Case, Tribunal Constitucional, STC 237/2005, Sept. 
26, 2005 [hereinafter Spanish Constitutional Court Decision]. 
 195 Id.  
 196 See generally JUDGING A DICTATOR: THE TRIAL OF GUATEMALA’S RÍOS MONTT, 
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that a former head of state had been tried for genocide in his own 
country.197  This widely publicized case is only part of the dramatic 
judicial awakening occurring in Guatemala, which has much to 
teach us about the value of international law at the local level.  Over 
the past decade, there has been a litany of convictions of the high 
military command responsible for grave international crimes in 
Guatemala.  Such prosecutions would have been unthinkable some 
thirty years back when the crimes occurred.  
 
4.  THE BLENDING OF TRUTH AND JUSTICE  
 
4.1.  Methodology 
 
In order to determine how truth and justice might be comple-
mentary, I engaged in original field research for this article begin-
ning in June 2016.  The first phase of my research focused primarily 
on library research and document analysis.  With the guidance of 
my host institutions, the University of San Carlos in Guatemala and 
the Autonomous University of Madrid in Spain, I engaged in inten-
sive research to familiarize myself with the legal systems of Guate-
mala and Spain, focusing in particular on their rules of criminal pro-
cedure and evidence at the trial level.  I also obtained authorization 
from Judge Víctor Hugo Herrera Ríos to attend hearings in a case 
involving the enforced disappearance of a fourteen year-old teen-
ager named Marco Antonio Molina Theissen and from Judge Clau-
dette Domínguez to review the court proceedings in a pending case 
involving crimes uncovered as the result of the exhumation of a 
mass grave at a former military base called CREOMPAZ.  Following 
these two ongoing cases deepened my understanding of the Guate-
malan judicial system.  
Additionally, with assistance from Guatemalan and Spanish 
judges, prosecutors, and human rights attorneys, I also obtained 
                                               
LM62] (describing the trial of Ríos Montt). 
 197 Ted Piccone and Ashley Miller, Rios Montt Trial an Example of National, In-
ternational Courts Working Together, BROOKINGS INSTITUTE (June 4, 2013), 
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/rios-montt-trial-an-example-of-national-
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copies of the trial sentences in the cases related to the armed conflict 
in which there have been convictions, as well as the complete record 
of the Guatemalan Generals case brought in Spain.  Because of the ex-
traordinary difficulty of obtaining access to these cases, I am the first 
person to have compiled and analyzed all of these primary docu-
ments.198  
In tandem with completing an in-depth review of these legal 
documents, I conducted semi-structured interviews with the Guate-
malan and Spanish prosecutors as well as the attorneys from human 
rights organizations that assisted them.  These interviews helped me 
understand why REMHI and CEH were critical to them as they built 
their cases.  Significantly, I was also able to interview many of the 
Guatemalan and Spanish judges who oversaw the cases involving 
human rights abuses committed during the armed conflict.  In addi-
tion, I interviewed the professional staff and leadership of CEH and 
REMHI in order to learn firsthand about the practices they em-
ployed when collecting evidence as well as the procedures they put 
in place to preserve evidence and protect those who offered testi-
mony.  
Overall, I interviewed three Guatemalan judges (including 
Judge Miguel Ángel Gálvez Aguilar), both of the Spanish investigat-
ing judges (Judge Guillermo Ruiz Polanco and Judge Santiago 
Pedraz), four employees of CEH (including Christian Tomuschat 
and Otilia Inés Lux de Cotí, two of the three Commissioners), two 
directors of REMHI, the former Attorney General of Guatemala 
(Claudia Paz y Paz), the current and former head of the war crimes 
unit in the Guatemalan Attorney General’s office (Hilda Pineda and 
Orlando Lopez), the former head of the International Commission 
against Impunity in Guatemala (Carlos Castresana), five attorneys 
who acted as private prosecutors in the Spanish case, the Legal Di-
rector of the International Foundation of Baltasar Garzón (FIBGAR), 
the current public prosecutor in Spain’s Attorney General’s Office in 
                                               
 198 Although all of Guatemalan sentences are technically public, the taboo na-
ture of the cases and the decentralization of the courts that processed them made 
accessing them remarkably challenging.  To obtain copies of the sentences, I trav-
eled long distances on dirt roads to courts or human rights organizations in remote, 
rural areas of Guatemala.  Because some courts did not have ready access to copiers, 
I took pictures of the decisions, some hundreds of pages long, with my phone or 
iPad.  I also often had to approach multiple sources to obtain them.  Accessing them 
is so challenging that even the current head of the war crimes unit in Guatemala 
City said that she does not have access to them all, in part because local jurisdictions 
will not share them with her.  Interview with Hilda Pineda, Head of the War Crimes 
Unit in the Guatemalan Attorney General’s Office (Nov. 22, 2016). 
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charge of prosecuting universal jurisdiction cases, an investigator at 
ODHAG, the Director and co-founder of the Guatemalan Forensic 
Anthropology Foundation (Fredy Peccerelli), the Director of the 
Myrna Mack Foundation (Helen Mack), the Director of Center for 
Legal Action on Human Rights (Juan Francisco Soto), and human 
rights attorneys from five Guatemalan human rights organizations 
who actively participated in the prosecutions in Guatemala under 
the designation of quellrantes adhesivos.  
 
4.2.  Justice in the TRC Reports 
 
While the common perception of Guatemalan transitional justice 
is that prosecutions for grave human rights violations are a rela-
tively recent advent,  there were a few early cases, which had a no-
table impact in Guatemala.  Indeed, through my fieldwork, I was 
able to document eleven cases in which there were convictions that 
pre-date the CEH and REMHI. 
While REHMI contained scant references to the various cases 
that pre-date it, the CEH referenced these cases throughout its re-
port.  For example, the CEH noted that in 1991 human rights and 
impunity became part of the national discussion because of the cases 
involving the assassinations of Myrna Mack and Michael Devine.199  
In particular, it noted that the Myrna Mack case, which was brought 
against both the low level officials who committed the crime and the 
high level officials who planned it, opened a new front in the fight 
for human rights that was quickly supported by different sectors of 
the social movement for human rights.200  The report noted that in 
both cases, the government argued it could not guarantee human 
rights while it was also fighting an armed conflict.201  
The CEH relied on these cases to come to various conclusions 
about the efficacy of the Guatemalan judiciary during the armed 
conflict.  Using the Mack case as an illustration, the CEH concluded 
that judicial proceedings were marred with irregularities and negli-
gence.  Specifically, it described how the Ministry of Defense 
blocked access to information needed to adjudicate the Mack case, 
and the court did not apply any of the corresponding sanctions for 
                                               
 199 CEH Report, supra note 80, at ¶ 715. 
 200 Id. at ¶ 718.  
 201 Id. at ¶ 715. 
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obstruction of justice.202  Citing a case involving a massacre at Santi-
ago Atitlan, the CEH concluded that during the armed conflict, the 
military tribunals were used as forums where selective justice could 
be employed.203  Although numerous military officials were in-
volved in the massacre, only one Sergeant and one  
Lieutenant were convicted.204  The CEH also cited the Xaman case, 
which found that military courts lacked the independence and 
impartiality to carry out criminal proceedings.205  The appellate 
court that rendered that decision pointed out that military judges 
were subject to the military hierarchy and that the Ministry of 
Defense paid their salaries.206 
In addition, the CEH pointed to the cases during the armed con-
flict, which were dismissed or overturned under questionable cir-
cumstances, as evidence that the judiciary was complicit in human 
rights violations during the armed conflict.207  For example, the CEH 
highlighted a case that became known as the case of 28. Confronted 
with the numerous disappearances that occurred during the armed 
conflict, one human rights organization filed 2,000 habeas corpus 
petitions, and only 28 were accepted.208  Later, the court concluded 
the vast majority of those 28 cases were unfounded.209  The CEH also 
described numerous cases in which Guatemala courts dismissed ha-
beas corpus petitions filed by family members in search of their 
loved ones as being unfounded and later information (or sometimes 
even the individual) surfaced, proving that their loved ones had 
been in the custody of the Guatemalan state all along.210  After re-
viewing these cases, the CEH concluded that the Guatemalan judi-
ciary was “an instrument of defense and protection of the powerful” 
and failed to uphold the fundamental rights of those subjected to 
grave human rights violations.211 
                                               
 202 Id. at ¶ 2784. 
 203 Id. at ¶ 2785–86. 
 204 Id.  
 205 Id. at ¶ 2787. 
 206 Id. at ¶ 2784. 
 207 Id. at ¶ 2686. 
 208 Id. at ¶ 2662. 
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 210 Id. at ¶ 2688–701. 
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However, even more informative than the irregularities of these 
cases, was the absolute absence of judicial action in others.  The CEH 
concluded that the failure of the Guatemalan judiciary to protect hu-
man rights during the armed conflict is undeniable “in light of the 
thousands of human rights violations registered by the CEH that 
were not investigated, judged, or sanctioned by the Guatemalan 
State.”212  By exposing the failures of the judiciary, the CEH drew 
attention to the need for judicial reform as a centerpiece of transi-
tional justice.  As one human rights advocate describe it, “in this 
way, the truth pulled justice along with it, it towed it, because it was 
clear from the report that what existed was a system of injustice.”213  
 
4.3.  “Truth-Full” Justice in Spanish Courts 
 
The CEH report played a critical role throughout the Guatemalan 
Generals case in Spain.  First, it was the factual foundation of the 
complaint that Rigoberta Menchú filed with the Spanish Audiencia 
Nacional, being cited and quoted continually throughout the com-
plaint as the primary source of both historical and contemporary 
facts regarding the case.214  Even the complaint itself acknowledged 
the special significance of the CEH report, characterizing it as “the 
most important source for this deliberation” and explaining that 
“the most important facts that motivated the presentation of the 
complaint originated from the CEH report.”215 
                                               
quienes han sido víctimas de graves violaciones de derechos humanos.”) 
 212 Id. at ¶ 2634 (page 127 of El Capítulo Segundo, Las Violaciones de Los 
Derechos Humanos y Los Hechos de Violencia, Continúa en El Tomo III).  (“El fra-
caso de la administración de justicia guatemalteca en la protección de los derechos 
humanos durante el enfrentamiento armado interno ha quedado clara y plena-
mente establecido, a la vista de miles de violaciones de derechos humanos registra-
das por la CEH que no fueron objeto de investigación, juicio ni sanción por el Estado 
de Guatemala.”). 
 213 Interview with Alejandro Rodriquez, supra note 61 (“En ese sentido tal vez 
la verdad ha jalado a la justicia… ha remolcado, porque lo que si se percibe 
claramente es un sistema de injusticia.”). 
 214 Spanish Complaint, supra note 191.  
 215 Id. at 1 (“En el marco general del final del proceso caracterizado por la 
firma de los Acuerdos de Paz, sobre los que más adelante haremos las precisiones 
necesarias, se determinó la creación de la Comision Para El Esclarecimiento 
Historico (CEH), que será la fuente más importante de nuestras ponderaciones.”).  
Id. at 13–14 (“Como la parte más importante de los hechos que motivan esta 
presentación tienen origen en lo informado por la COMISIÓN PARA EL 
ESCLARECIMIENTO HISTÓRICO (CEH) . . . .”). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
  
788 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 39:3 
 
4.3.1.  TRCs’ Influence on Judicial Decision-making in Spain 
 
The CEH report also had a significant influence on judicial deci-
sion-making in the case.  Since the complaint was filed under a pro-
cedure called a ‘popular action’ (acción popular), which allows for 
private citizens to file complaints when a crime affects society as a 
whole, it did not require the support of the public prosecutor from 
the Spanish Attorney General’s office.  In fact, the office actively op-
posed it.216  When the Spanish Attorney General petitioned to have 
the case dismissed in January 2000, one of his reasons was that the 
CEH had already investigated the crimes in question.217  On March 
27, 2000, the investigating judge, Judge Guillermo Ruiz Polanco, de-
nied his petition, explaining that the facts alleged in the complaint—
again, largely reliant on the CEH report—were sufficient enough in-
dicators (diligencias) of genocidal acts to warrant further investiga-
tion at that stage.218  
In the series of appeals that followed that decision, the conclu-
sions of the CEH report were determinative in the courts’ consider-
ation of whether Spain could exercise universal jurisdiction in this 
case.  On appeal, the en banc panel of the Criminal Section of the 
Spanish Audiencia Nacional concluded that pursuant to the subsidi-
ary principle, in order for Spanish courts to exercise universal juris-
diction over a case, the complainant must establish the inaction or 
ineffectiveness of the judiciary where the crime occurred—in this 
case, Guatemala.219  In justifying its decision to overrule Judge Po-
lanco, the panel reasoned that, even though the findings of the CEH 
had no judicial effect (pursuant to its mandate), the CEH had specif-
ically recommended that the State bring cases based on the evidence 
                                               
 216 JUAN DAMIÁN MORENO, LECCIONES INTRODUCTORIAS SOBRE PROCESO PENAL 
34 (2013); Guatemalan Generals Case, Juzgado Central de Instrucción Nº 1, 
Audiencia Nacional, Diligencias previas 331/99, Mar. 27, 2000, at 7 (on file with the 
author). 
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hechos ocurridos en la República de Guatemala que, por otra parte, están siendo 
investigados por la Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico.”) (quoting the pub-
lic prosecutor’s petition, establishing that the Commission on Historical Clarifica-
tion is investigating the developments in the Republic of Guatemala) (on file with 
the author). 
 218 Id. at 11. 
 219 Guatemalan Generals Case, Sala de lo Penal de la Audiencia Nacional, Di-
ligencias previas 331/99, Rollo Apelacion N° 115/2000 (2000). 
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documented in its report.220  Furthermore, noting that the CEH re-
port had only been published on February 25, 1999 and the com-
plaint was filed on December 2, 1999, the court concluded that ten 
months was not long enough to decide definitively that the Guate-
malan judiciary was inactive.221  
Later, the Spanish Supreme Court rejected this reasoning, stat-
ing that the court should have considered the date that the acts oc-
curred, not when the CEH published its report.222  It also found that 
the en banc panel of the Criminal Section of the Spanish Audiencia 
Nacional committed an error in evaluating the facts because the CEH 
explicitly concluded that the Guatemalan judiciary was ineffec-
tive.223  The Spanish Supreme Court thus partially overturned the 
Criminal Section’s decision, allowing the prosecutions to move for-
ward for the acts against Spanish citizens only because they impli-
cated the Spanish national interest.224  Later, the Constitutional 
Court, the highest court in Spain with the authority to decide con-
stitutional matters, overturned the Supreme Court, concluding that 
it improperly added the requirement of having “a connection with 
national interests,” which was not present in the universal jurisdic-
tion statute.225  The Constitutional Court thus upheld Judge Po-
lanco’s decision that the complainant presented enough evidence to 
move forward with the investigation.226 
In 2006, the case was reassigned to Investigating Judge Santiago 
Pedraz after Judge Polanco was transferred to another jurisdic-
tion.227  In Judge Pedraz’s own words, the work of CEH, as well as 
of REMHI, was “fundamental to this case.”228  He told me that the 
CEH was especially useful because it was the most detailed account 
of what happened in Guatemala and had the credibility of the UN 
behind it.229  Tomuschat also testified before Judge Pedraz and ex-
plained why the CEH found that acts of genocide occurred in 
                                               
 220 Id. at 6. 
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 222 Guatemalan Generals Case, Sala de lo Penal del Tribunal Supremo, 
Recurso de Casacion Nº 803/2001, Sentencia Nº 327/2003 (2003) at 19. 
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tencia Nº237/2005 (2005). 
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 227 Interview with Judge Polanco (Oct. 27, 2016). 
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Guatemala and what their methodology was.230 
The importance of the TRC reports to Judge Pedraz is also clear 
from the record.  For example, when he issued the international or-
der for the arrest of Ríos Montt, Ángel Aníbal Guevara, Germán 
Chupina, Humberto Mejía Victores, Pedro García Arredondo, Don-
aldo Álvarez, and Benedicto Lucas García in July 2006, he based his 
factual findings almost entirely on the CEH and REMHI reports.231  
Specifically, in that order, he referred to the CEH report as proof that 
the defendants in question were in charge of and had effective con-
trol over the military and paramilitary forces who perpetrated the 
massacres, enforced disappearances, rapes, displacements and 
bombings that were the subject of the complaint.232  He also referred 
to the CEH’s description of military commissioners and PACs and 
to the statistical findings of the CEH regarding the numbers of grave 
violations of human rights.233 
Acting upon Judge Pedraz’s order, a Guatemalan court issued 
arrest warrants for four of the six defendants in the case.234  How-
ever, after a year of detention (of those who did not flee the country), 
on December 12, 2007, the Guatemalan Constitutional Court 
blocked the extradition of those defendants.  According to Judge 
Pedraz, because the Guatemalan Constitutional Court blocked him 
from conducting his own investigation in Guatemala, the CEH re-
port was essential to the continuation of the case.235 
In addition to interviewing both investigating judges assigned 
to the Guatemalan Generals case and consulting the record, I also in-
terviewed a number of attorneys who worked as private prosecutors 
(as opposed to the public prosecutor from the Spanish Attorney 
General’s office) in this case.236  Since all of the attorneys I inter-
viewed had worked on other universal jurisdiction cases as well, 
                                               
 230 Interview with Christian Tomuschat, supra note 109; Interview with Na-
omi Roht-Arriaza, supra note 91. 
 231 Guatemalan Generals Case, Juzgado Central de Instrucción Nº 1, 
Audiencia Nacional, Diligencias previas 331/99 (2006). 
 232 Id. at 10–16. 
 233 Id. at 13–15, 22, 25–26. 
 234 Guatemalan Generals Case, Corte de Constitucionalidad de Guatemala, 
Expediente 3380-2007, Sentencia (2007).  See also Roht-Arriaza, Making the State Do 
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 235 Interview with Judge Pedraz, supra note 228. 
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they often spoke in general terms about how the work of truth com-
missions had been an asset to them.  For instance, Enrique Santiago 
Romero, who has worked on numerous universal jurisdiction cases 
in which the reports of truth commissions were used to support the 
claims of his clients, said that the authenticity of the facts in the truth 
commission reports is usually assumed.237  He did not know of a 
single case in which the judge or the accused challenged the facts 
alleged in the reports of truth commission.238  Joan Garcés, the only 
surviving personal advisor of Chilean President Salvador Allende 
and lead counsel in the Pinochet universal jurisdiction case, ex-
plained to me that this is because TRCs usually are sanctioned by 
the state.239 
Carlos Slepoy, an Argentinian attorney who was the victim of 
kidnapping and torture under Argentinian President Isabel Mar-
tínez de Perón and has served as a private prosecutor in numerous 
universal jurisdiction cases, said that UN-backed truth commissions 
in particular are given more weight because they are considered to 
be neutral.240  He also found that courts gave more weight to TRCs 
when they are composed of panels of experts rather than politi-
cians.241  Carlos Slepoy pointed out that Guatemala was a great ex-
ample of this, since the legal team used the factual findings from the 
CEH report as the foundation of their case.242  In particular, he be-
lieves that the CEH’s finding that there were acts that could be clas-
sified as genocide was particularly significant for the Spanish 
courts.243  According to Slepoy, the report had automatic credibility 
                                               
 237 Interview with Enrique Santiago Romero (Dec. 4, 2015).  Specifically, 
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Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
  
792 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 39:3 
with the court, which never questioned its authority due to the im-
plied legitimacy of its source.244  However, in other cases he has 
worked on, the Spanish court did not give the same weight to re-
ports by national truth commissions.245 
 
4.3.2.  TRCs as the Principal Investigators in UJ Cases 
 
Similar to its use by Guatemalan attorneys described later in this 
article, Enrique Santiago Romero described to me how truth com-
missions were helpful when they were trying to identify witnesses 
and perpetrators, particularly when civil society from the country 
where the crimes occurred is less organized.246  Carlos Slepoy fur-
ther elaborated, stating that in the Guatemalan Generals case the legal 
team and the investigating judge used the lists of victims in both 
TRC reports to determine who they might contact to identify poten-
tial witnesses and perpetrators.247  
Manuel Miguel Vergara Céspedes, the Legal Director for the In-
ternational Foundation of Baltasar Garzón (FIBGAR), who did not 
work on the Guatemalan Generals case, but is an expert on universal 
jurisdiction in general, explained that the evidence gathered by truth 
commissions is especially important in the context of universal ju-
risdiction.248  This is because the majority of universal jurisdiction 
cases have occurred in civil law countries, where an independent 
investigating judge leads the investigation.249  Since in universal ju-
risdiction cases, investigating judges rarely are able to investigate in 
the countries where the alleged crimes occurred—as was the case 
with Judge Pedraz in the Guatemalan Generals case—judges are heav-
ily reliant on the fact-finding of others, especially TRCs.250 At the 
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same time, Pedro Martínez Torrijos, the current prosecutor in charge 
of prosecuting universal jurisdiction cases on behalf of the Spanish 
Attorney General, cautioned that TRC reports usually can only be 
used as indirect evidence (as distinguished from direct evidence, or 
“prueba plena,” which directly proves the commission of crime), 
since there is no opportunity to confront the witnesses.251  
While the CEH report was critical to the Spanish case, that case 
also helped to raise the profile of the CEH report.  The Spanish case 
represented the first time that the report was submitted as evidence 
in a criminal case.252  This helped to diffuse the report to a broader 
audience, both internationally and nationally.253  While there were a 
number of cases with convictions after the release of the CEH report, 
only after the Spanish case did Guatemalan attorneys start regularly 
admitting the CEH report as evidence in their cases.254  This inter-
play between the CEH, the Spanish courts, and Guatemalan courts 
provides a compelling example of the multidirectional and porous 
nature of post-conflict pluralism. 
 
4.4.  “Truth-Full” Justice in Guatemalan Courts 
 
After the Spanish case, the admission of the CEH and REMHI 
reports at the criminal trials in Guatemala became increasingly com-
mon, especially as attorneys set their sights on prosecuting the so-
called “intellectual authors of the crimes.”  These intellectual au-
thors were the ones who planned and ordered criminal acts but re-
lied on their subordinates to carry them out.  In total, I documented 
thirty cases involving crimes committed during the armed conflict 
that resulted in convictions (including two before military tribu-
nals).255  In fourteen of the nineteen cases that concluded after the 
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CEH report was publicly released in 1999, the court either admitted 
the CEH report as evidence or referenced its findings.  The admis-
sion of the REMHI report was less common but still significant.  In 
seven of the twenty-one cases that concluded after REMHI issued its 
report in 1998, the court admitted either the REMHI report itself or 
evidence that REMHI collected.  Echoing the sentiment expressed 
by Spanish human rights attorneys, Guatemalan human rights at-
torneys explained that they believed that the courts gave the CEH 
report more weight because it was an official report, ostensibly sanc-
tioned by the Guatemalan government.256 
Despite the admonition that the CEH report should not have any 
judicial effect, judges have regularly admitted it (and the REMHI re-
port) into evidence as “documentary evidence” (prueba documental).  
Under Guatemalan law, the judge can admit and consider documen-
tary evidence, but it cannot be the only source of evidence in a 
case.257  However, it can be taken into account as part of the cumu-
lative evidence in a case.258  As a matter of course, Guatemalan trial 
courts explain the probative weight (valor probatorio) given to each 
piece of admitted evidence in a case.  This provides an exact under-
standing of how much weight the courts gave to the TRC reports 
that were admitted as evidence and insight into how these reports 
informed the courts’ decisions.  Consequently, a review of these sen-
tences reveals that the reports were helpful in identifying those re-
sponsible at the structural or systemic level, analyzing the causes 
and consequences of the armed conflict and providing the social and 
historical context in which the grave crimes occurred.  The reports 
also had an important role in the prosecution of gender-based vio-
lence during the armed conflict as they demonstrated that rape was 
systematically employed to demoralize and splinter the Mayan 
communities, who were viewed as actual or future supporters of the 
guerilla forces. 
 
                                               
they are instructive when demonstrating how trial courts weight the CEH and 
REMHI reports. 
 256 Interview with Mynor Alvarado, supra note 154. 
 257 Interview with Alejandro Rodriguez, supra note 61 (“Básicamente es una 
prueba documental que el juez la puede valorar, no puede por sí misma probar 
nada, pero en conjunto con los demás elementos de prueba ya tiene un valor.”). 
 258 Id. 
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4.4.1.  Truth Commissions as Historians  
 
One of the courts’ most striking uses of the TRC reports in Gua-
temala was as a source for the historical context of the crimes in 
question.  These historical facts fall within the broader category of 
legislative facts, which inform the underlying narrative through 
which a court understands a case.  Legislative facts are distinct from 
record facts.  They are not specific to a case, but rather “include more 
generic facts about the world that inform judges’ legal decisions.”259 
Through a close examination of these decisions, we see how 
courts looked to historical and social context, not solely as the back-
drop of a crime, but also to determine motive.  Indeed, it was only 
with a deep understanding of the historical context that the courts 
were able to attribute criminal responsibility to the intellectual au-
thors, who orchestrated the crimes from behind the scenes but did 
not directly carry them out.  Prior to the release of the CEH report, 
there were only convictions of low-level officials for ordinary 
crimes.260   
A comparison between the sentences that courts rendered before 
the release of the TRC reports and those rendered after their release 
illuminates how influential they were to judicial decision-making.  
In particular, an analysis of the two trials involving the murder of 
Myrna Mack Chang, one taking place before the release of the CEH 
report and the other after, demonstrates the profound impact the re-
port had on the court’s understanding of the motive for the crime.  
Myrna Mack was an anthropologist who worked for the Associ-
ation for the Advancement of Social Sciences in Guatemala 
(AVANCSO) and was investigating the displacement and repatria-
tion of communities during the armed conflict.261  After several days 
of surveillance, members of the Security Section of the Presidential 
                                               
 259 Pammela Quinn, Advancing the Conversation: Non-Judicial Voices and the 
Transnational Judicial Dialogue, supra note 14, at 56. 
 260 The convictions that occurred before 2000 were all against lower level of-
ficials for ordinary crimes, such as assassination, homicide, and grave injury.  See, 
e.g., Myrna Mack Chang I, Pieza 20: 3630–50, Sentencia de la Sala Cuarta de la Corte 
de Apelaciones, April 28, 1993 [hereinafter Myrna Mack Chang I]; Rio Negro I, Part 
A, supra note 255; Rio Negro I, Part B, 01-98, Of. 1°, Tribunal de Sentencia Penal 
Narcoactividad y Delitos contra el Ambiente de Salamá (1999) [hereinafter Rio Ne-
gro I, Part B]; Noriega Estrada, Expediente No. 22-96, Tribunal de Sentencia Penal, 
Narcoactividad y Delitos contra el Ambiente del departamento de El Quiché (1999) 
[hereinafter Noriega Estrada]. 
 261 Myrna Mack Chang I, supra note 260, at 7. 
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General Staff (EMP), the Guatemalan equivalent of the U.S. Secret 
Service, stabbed her twenty-seven times outside of her office in Gua-
temala City, resulting in her death.262  
In 1993, in large part due to the unrelenting advocacy of her sis-
ter Helen Mack, Myrna Mack I became the first case in Guatemala in 
which there was a conviction for crimes related to the armed con-
flict.263  In that case, the court convicted Noel de Jesús Beteta Alva-
rez, who was directly involved in her murder, basing its decision 
primarily on eyewitness testimony, forensic reports, and photo-
graphs.  However, the court characterized the crime as if it was an 
ordinary crime unrelated to the armed conflict.  In its decision, the 
court made no mention of the armed conflict and only noted that the 
defendant was a Sergeant Major Specialist of the EMP as part of its 
more general description of the defendant.264  In addition, even 
though the Human Rights Ombudsman who brought the case char-
acterized her murder as extrajudicial killing in the complaint, the 
court found Beteta Alvarez guilty of assassination, seemingly view-
ing her murder as unassociated with the Guatemalan govern-
ment.265  The court only mentioned the nature of her work once, 
when admitting testimony about her research, but specified that this 
testimony “only establishe[d] the work that she did” and failed to 
link her work to the motive for the crime.266  
The trial court also closed the investigations into the EMP chiefs 
who allegedly ordered her murder because, according to the court, 
there was no proof that they gave the order to kill Myrna Mack 
Chang.267  Later, the Guatemalan Supreme Court reversed the trial 
court’s decision on this question only, concluding that the trial court 
had been derelict in its duty to establish the facts of the case by ex-
amining the intersection between “historical truth” and “legal 
                                               
 262 David Baluarte & Erin Chlopak, The Case of Myrna Mack Chang: Overcoming 
Institutional Impunity in Guatemala, 10 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 11 (2003), http://digitalcom-
mons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1417&context=hrbrief. 
 263 Id.  See also LAURA BRIGGS, SOMEBODY’S CHILDREN: THE POLITICS OF 
TRANSNATIONAL AND TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION 231 (2012). 
 264 Myrna Mack Chang I, supra note 260, at 31. 
 265 Id. at 33. 
 266 Id. at 31 (“Lo declarado por Clara Josefina María Arenas Bianchi, Carmen 
Rosa de León Escribano, Marco Tulio Gutiérrez Arenales, refieren las 
investigaciones realizadas por Myrna Elizabeth Mack Chang, sobre refugiados, ex 
patriados y desplazados, su preocupación por los indígenas que habitaban áreas de 
conflicto, principalmente Quiché y Cobán, y la proyección que tenían sus 
investigaciones, solo prueba el trabajo por ella realizado.”). 
 267 Id. at 33. 
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truth,” which courts should deduce, in accordance with the law, 
from what appears in the record.268  The Supreme Court reasoned 
that the trial court should have taken the claims by the Ombudsman 
seriously because the EMP had undeniably participated in numer-
ous extrajudicial killing of Guatemalan citizens, particularly those 
who were involved in certain activities such as researching the dis-
placement of indigenous communities, as Myrna Mack did.269 
Thus, on remand, in Myrna Mack Chang II, the trial court drew 
much of its understanding about the motive for her death from the 
historical and social context described in the REMHI and CEH re-
ports, which by then had both been released.  Specifically, the court 
admitted the second volume of the CEH report, because it provided 
a contemporary history of Guatemala and the occurrences of the 
armed conflict.270  Upon learning about the National Security Doc-
trine described in the CEH report, the court concluded that the gov-
ernment erroneously classified Myrna Mack Chang as an “internal 
enemy,” linking her to the displaced people she researched in the 
interior of the country.271  
                                               
 268 Myrna Mack Chang I, Pieza 20: 3658–88, Corte Suprema de Justicia (1994) 
(“Comprobará y establecerá los hechos buscando la coincidencia entre la verdad 
histórica y la formal o jurídica y resolverá, conforme las constancias procesales.  En 
todo caso, prevalecerá la verdad formal deducida, conforme a la ley, de lo que 
aparezca en autos.  Existe violación de esta norma procesal cuando la Sala no asume 
la obligación de promover la investigación sobre la participación de Edgar Augusto 
Godoy Gaitan, Juan Valencia Osorio, Juan Guilermo Oliva Carrera, Juan Jose Lario, 
Juan Jose Del Cid Morales y un Individuo de Apellido Charchal.”). 
 269 Id. at 22 (“Que la valoración de estos medios de prueba es esencial cuando 
el Procurador de los Derechos Humanos declaró formalmente que se trataba de un 
asesinato de naturaleza política que involucraba a las fuerzas de seguridad del 
Estado de Guatemala.  Expuso, que en nuestro medio, es innegable que las fuerzas 
de seguridad han participado abiertamente en la ejecución extrajudicial de 
ciudadanos guatemaltecos, en los que ha estado incluido el Estado Mayor 
Presidencial.  También forma parte de la experiencia social que cierto tipo de 
actividades comportan el riesgo de convertir a los ciudadanos en víctimas de la 
represión del Estado; que asuntos relacionados con refugiados, desplazados y 
repatriados forman parte de estas actividades.”). 
 270 Myrna Mack Chang II, Tribunal Tercero de Sentencia Penal, Narcoactividad 
y Delitos contra el Ambiente de Guatemala, C-5-99 Of. 3ro., Sentence, Oct. 3, 2002, 
24. [hereinafter Myrna Mack Chang II] (“Informe de la Comisión para el 
Esclarecimiento Histórico (CEH) Guatemala, Memorias del Silencio, Tomo II: Las 
Violaciones de los Derechos Humanos y Hechos de Violencia, Primera Edición, en 
las páginas y números de textos asentadas en el acta correspondiente nos sirven 
para conocer la historia contemporánea y su contenido nos permite conocer que fue 
lo que ocurrió durante el conflicto armando . . . .”). 
 271 Id. (“[A]l leer el contenido de la doctrina de la Seguridad Nacional 
concluimos que la Antropóloga Myrna Mack se le considero erróneamente enemigo 
interno, al vincular su trabajo científico con la situación que vivían los desplazados 
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Similarly, the court admitted the third volume of REMHI, enti-
tled “Historical Context,” because it educated the court about the 
social, political, and economic evolution of the country from 1986 to 
1990 and the relationship between the army and broader society.272  
In doing so, it noted the CEH’s and REMHI’s mutual finding that 
Myrna Mack Chang’s murder occurred days after the Comunidades 
de Población en Resistencia had made a complaint about the activities 
of the military.273  Citing the REMHI report, which described her as 
the only independent expert on internal displacement in Guatemala, 
the court concluded that her death was meant to send a message to 
the civilian population.274  Thus, on the basis of both reports and 
other evidence presented, the court found that the motive of her 
murder was political and convicted the three chiefs of the EMP.275  
This was the first time that a Guatemalan court had convicted the 
high-level officials, who planned crimes associated with the armed 
conflict, but did not directly carry them out.  
Similarly, a comparison of the decisions in Rio Negro I and Rio 
Negro II demonstrates how the CEH report, which was admitted into 
evidence in Rio Negro II, but not Rio Negro I, was critical to the courts’ 
consideration of the criminal acts under examination by the courts.  
The case involved a massacre, during which paramilitary and mili-
tary forces brutally murdered numerous Mayan women and chil-
dren from a village called Rio Negro.276  As described in the CEH 
report, the Guatemalan military targeted the inhabitants of Rio 
                                               
en el interior del país, así mismo confirma el móvil político de su asesinato.”). 
 272 Id. (“Informe de la Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico (CEH) Gua-
temala, Memorias del Silencio, Tomo II: Las Violaciones de los Derechos Humanos 
y Hechos de Violencia, Primera Edición, en las páginas y números de textos asen-
tadas en el acta correspondiente, nos sirven para conocer la historia contemporánea 
y su contenido nos permite conocer que fue lo que ocurrió durante el conflicto ar-
mando . . . .”). See also id. (“Los párrafos citados narran el desenvolvimiento social, 
político y económico de Guatemala de mil novecientos ochenta y seis a mil nove-
cientos noventa, describiendo el actuar del ejército en relación a la sociedad.”). 
 273 Id. (“Al igual que en el informe rendido por la Comisión de 
Esclarecimiento Histórico, se da a conocer la difícil situación que vivían los 
desplazados y la denuncia efectuada por las Comunidades de Población en 
Resistencia, el siete de septiembre de mil novecientos noventa, días antes del 
asesinato de Myrna Mack . . . .”). 
 274 Id. (“[E]n el informe se cita a la antropóloga como la única experta 
independiente en el tema de los desplazados y como su muerte constituyó un 
mensaje a la población civil, calificando su asesinato de orden político.”). 
 275 Id. 
 276 Kathleen Dill, International Human Rights and Local Justice in Guatemala: The 
Rio Negro (Pak'oxom) and Agua Fria Trials, 17 CULTURAL DYNAMICS 323, 325 (2005). 
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Negro, in part, because they rejected a plan to relocate them from 
their ancestral lands near the Chixoy River where the Guatemalan 
government planned to build a hydroelectric dam, a project funded 
by the World Bank.277  
Neither of the two sentences in Rio Negro I made any mention of 
this background, which is essential to understanding the motive for 
the crime and its connection to the military’s broader campaign.  In 
the first sentence in Rio Negro I, the trial court convicted three para-
military officers who played a significant role in the Rio Negro mas-
sacre, but concluded that the officers took the law, as they inter-
preted it, into their own hands and acted without authorization 
from the military.278  After the Court of Appeals in Coban over-
turned this decision on other grounds, the trial court, on remand, 
denied any connection at all between the military and the three of-
ficers, describing the defendants as farmers who arrived with a 
group of other men to Rio Negro.279  The court also refused to admit 
the executive order that specified the purpose and authority of the 
PACs into evidence, saying that it was not enough to prove that the 
accused were members.280  
In direct contrast to Rio Negro I, the trial court in Rio Negro II con-
cluded that “in order to analyze the existence of a crime, its judicial 
classification, and the criminal responsibility of the accused, it [was] 
essential to situate the facts in question within the historical and so-
cial-political context in which they occurred.”281  The court thus 
heavily relied on the CEH in its decision.  Specifically, the CEH re-
port informed the court’s understanding of the causes and conse-
quences of the Rio Negro massacre, situating it within the Guatema-
lan government’s broader fight against communism.282  As the court 
explained, quoting the CEH report, the government had invented a 
new adversary called the “internal enemy,” which was broadly 
                                               
 277 CEH, Illustrative Case No. 10: Massacre and Elimination of the Community of 
Río Negro, Guatemala, Memoria del Silencio, vol. VI, annex I, 45–47. 
 278 Rio Negro I, Part A, supra note 255, at 28. 
 279 Rio Negro I, Part B, supra note 260, at 1–2, 67. 
 280 Id. at 64. 
 281 Rio Negro II, Nº 28-2003, Tribunal de Sentencia Penal Narcoactividad y 
Delitos contra el Ambiente de Salamá, Baja Verapaz, Sentence, May 28, 2008, 315, 
325 (“Al analizar la existencia del delito, su calificación jurídica, y la responsabili-
dad penal de los procesados, es de obligatoria referencia ubicar el contexto histórico 
y político-social en el cual se desarrollaron los hechos sometidos a juicio.”) [herein-
after Rio Negro II]. 
 282 Id. at 316. 
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defined as “any person, social group, demand, or idea susceptible of 
being a launching point, ally, or eventual support to international 
communism, either currently or at some point in the future.”283  This 
casting of a wide net of adversaries explained why the army tar-
geted communities and individuals that had little to no contact with 
guerrilla forces.  Again, drawing from the CEH report, the court 
noted that the army considered the location of the massacre to be an 
area that was strategically important because of its geographic posi-
tion and socio-economic importance in the region, even though it 
never really was a combat zone.284  Fearing that “subversive propa-
ganda” might appeal to the population, the army started by selec-
tively disappearing or killing local leaders, but with time, imple-
mented strategies that indiscriminately targeted anyone who might 
have some relation with the guerilla movement.285 
Numerous other Guatemalan courts also admitted both the 
REMHI and CEH reports for the historical and social context they 
provided.  For example, in Sepur Zarco, the court also admitted 
REMHI and CEH because it provided information about the lived 
experience of the climate of violence during the armed conflict and 
“contained the recent history of Guatemala, which all Guatemalans 
need to know in order to prevent the reoccurrence [of violence].”286  
In both the Dos Erres and Ríos Montt cases, the courts, using identical 
language, described the CEH report as “a historical document that 
provides understanding of the wartime ideology that existed during 
the armed conflict, which is the central reference point for the crim-
inal acts that we are judging.”287  In Ríos Montt, in addition to admit-
ting the CEH report, the trial court also admitted the REMHI report 
because it served as a compilation of the recent history of 
                                               
 283 Id. 
 284 Id. at 317. 
 285 Id. at 317.  
 286 Sepur Zarco, C-01076-2012-00021 Of. 2°, Tribunal Primero de Sentencia 
Penal Narcoactividad y Delitos contra el Ambiente de Guatemala (Tribunal de 
Mayor Riesgo “A”), Sentence, Feb. 26, 2016. [hereinafter Sepur Zarco] (“Dicho 
informe contiene la Historia reciente de Guatemala, la cual debe ser conocida por 
todos los guatemaltecos para evitar su repetición.”). 
 287 Dos Erres, C-01076-2010-00003, Tribunal Primero de Sentencia Penal 
Narcoactividad y Delitos contra el Ambiente de Guatemala, Sentence, Aug. 2, 2011, 
236 [hereinafter Dos Erres] (“Es un documento histórico que permite conocer la 
guerra ideológica existente durante el conflicto armado, siendo el marco de 
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Guatemala.288 
In sharp contrast to the above cases, in Edgar Fernando Garcia I, 
the court refused to admit the REMHI report into evidence.  This is 
the only case I have found in which court failed to admit a TRC re-
port, wholesale, into evidence.  Although the court stated that it 
thought it was important to know the history of the Guatemalan 
armed conflict so that the events do not repeat themselves, that his-
tory did not contribute to verifying whether the accused partici-
pated in the acts in question.289  However, in that same case, the 
court admitted the portion of the CEH report specifically related to 
Edgar Fernando Garcia’s disappearance, ironically as a “written, 
historical reference” of the extreme events that occurred.290  
In direct contradiction to the reasoning in Edgar Fernando Garcia 
I, in Edgar Fernando Garcia II, a case involving the intellectual authors 
of the disappearance, the court admitted Volume III of REMHI, en-
titled “Historical Context.”291  Specifically, the court stated that it ad-
mitted the REMHI report because it was a historical study of the sit-
uation in the 1980s in Guatemala, identified the victims of repression 
during those years, and described the violence against social leaders 
at the time.292  However, the court rejected Volume VI of REMHI 
entitled “Victims of the Conflict,” because it “only contained a list of 
places.”293  The court admitted the same part of the CEH report as 
the trial court did in Edgar Fernando Garcia I because it established 
that the crime was committed in the context of the armed conflict, 
when enforced disappearances of student leaders, particularly from 
the University of San Carlos, were common.294  This case is signifi-
cant because it was the first time that senior police officials were con-
victed “for their role in ordering, overseeing, and then concealing 
the crime.”295  
                                               
 288 Id. at 664. 
 289 Edgar Fernando García I, C-01069-1997-00001, Tribunal Octavo de Sentencia 
Penal, Narcoactividad y Delitos Contra el Ambiente del Departmento de 
Guatemala, Sentence, Oct. 28, 2010, 71–72. [hereinafter Edgar Fernando Garcia I]. 
 290 Id. at 68. 
 291 Edgar Fernando García II, C-01069-1997-00001 Of. 3°, Tribunal Primero de 
Sentencia Penal Narcoactividad y Delitos contra el Ambiente de Guatemala 
(Tribunal de Mayor Riesgo “A”), Sentence, Sept. 20, 2013, 151. [hereinafter Edgar 
Fernando Garcia II]. 
 292 Id. at 148.  See also REMHI Report, supra note 151, at 90–106, 127–54. (Vol-
ume III, Historical Context). 
 293 Edgar Fernando Garcia II, supra note 291, at 151–52. 
 294 Id. at 95–96. 
 295 Guatemalan Court Convicts National Police Chief, THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
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4.4.2.  Truth Commissions as Experts in Organizational 
Responsibility 
 
The TRC reports also aided courts to understand the operations 
of military units and therefore attribute responsibility up the chain 
of command. Hilda Pineda explained that the TRCs illustrated how 
various members of the military apparatus, such as the military 
commissioners, the intelligence agents, and the police, might have 
participated in the armed conflict.296  For example, in Rio Negro II, 
the CEH report informed the court’s understanding of the PACs.297  
As the CEH report explains, and the court recites, the army man-
dated the creation of this paramilitary group around 1981.298  CEH 
attributed numerous human rights violations during the war to var-
ious PACs across the country, which were sometimes committed of 
their own accord and sometimes in collusion with government 
forces.299  The admission of this evidence is noteworthy because, as 
stated above, the second trial court in Rio Negro I rejected the admis-
sion of the law that created the PACs, asserting that at no time was 
it proven that the accused had been enlisted as PACs.300  
Similarly, in Jute, the court admitted the portion of the CEH re-
port that described “the mechanisms of terror” used by the Guate-
malan government to disappear people considered to be enemies of 
the state.301  In particular, the court found the CEH’s elucidation of 
the inter-workings of the PACs as well as the military commission-
ers, another group created by the military to involve local popula-
tions in its counterinsurgency strategies, particularly useful.302  With 
                                               
ARCHIVE (Sept. 24, 2013), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB440/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZEK9-RM6G]. 
 296 Interview with Hilda Pineda, supra note 198.  (“Hay algunos estudios 
específicos dentro las comisiones de la verdad o los informes de la comisión que se 
relación a las estructuras que pudieron haber participado, por ejemplo, cómo 
funcionaba la defensa civil, los comisionados militares, la inteligencia del ejército, 
de la policía, los operativos combinados.”) 
 297 Rio Negro II, supra note 281, at 318. 
 298 Id. at 318. 
 299 Id. 
 300 Rio Negro I, Part B, supra note 260, at 64. 
 301 Jute, 195-2008. Of. 2, El Tribunal Primero de Sentencia Penal, 
Narcoactividad y el Tribunal de Delitos Contra el Ambiente del Departamento de 
Chiquimula, Sentence, Dec. 3, 2009, at 124–27. 
 302 Id. at 124. 
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regard to military commissioners, the court admitted the portion of 
the CEH report that detailed their organization, structure, chain of 
command, and duties.303  As the CEH explained, military commis-
sioners actively participated in denouncing members of their com-
munities to the military, which ultimately resulted in detention, dis-
appearances, and extrajudicial killings.304  Sometimes, they would 
denounce people who had nothing to do with the guerilla, out of a 
desire to keep peace or fear of reprisal from the military.305  The mil-
itary commissioners were also involved in the capture and transfer 
of people believed to be part of or helping the guerillas.306  For ex-
ample, sometimes they would use their homes as detention centers, 
torture people, or assist in enforced disappearances.307  When admit-
ting the report, the court praised the methodology of the CEH re-
port, saying that its credibility was unquestionable.308  
In the case regarding the disappearance of Edgar Leonel Paredes 
Chegüén, the court also admitted the sections of the CEH report ex-
plaining the involvement of military commissioners in enforced dis-
appearances.309  The court highlighted the following specific infor-
mation from the CEH report that it found helpful:  1) in the western 
part of Guatemala, where the disappearance in this case occurred, 
the military commissioners were linked to death squads; 2) one in 
every three human rights violations was committed by a paramili-
tary force; 3) military commissioners and the military were respon-
sible for systematic human rights violations and crimes against the 
humanity perpetrated during the armed conflict against the civil 
population; and 4) the majority of the violations they committed 
were extrajudicial killings, torture, deprivation of liberty, enforced 
disappearances, and rape.310  In Edgar Fernando Garcia II, the court 
admitted Volume II, because it explained how the National Police 
                                               
 303 Id. at 127. 
 304 Id. at 126. 
 305 Id. at 126. 
 306 Id.  
 307 Id. at 126–27. 
 308 Id.  
 309 Edgar Leonel Paredes Chegüén, C-20003-2009-000223, Tribunal Primero de 
Sentencia Penal Narcoactividad y Delitos contra el Ambiente de Guatemala (Mayor 
Reisgo “B”), Sentence, March 26, 2013, 46. [hereinafter Edgar Leonel Paredes 
Chegüén]. See CEH Report, supra note 80, at 158–81 (Chapter 2, Violation of Human 
Rights and Acts of Violence, Title V, Military Commissioners).  See also id. at 404–58 
(Chapter 2, Violation of Human Rights and Acts of Violence, Title XI, Enforced Dis-
appearance).  
 310 Edgar Leonel Paredes Chegüén, supra note 309, at 46. 
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functioned in the 1980s.311  This evidence was significant in that case, 
because the people accused of the disappearance were two heads of 
the National Police.312 
Alejandro Rodriquez, a human rights attorney for Impunity 
Watch, who was the quellrante adhesivo in the Molina Theissen case, 
explained that in that case he used the conclusions of the CEH to 
demonstrate the pattern and practice of the military.  Specifically, he 
used it to show that there was a secret military unit that would take 
people to military zones and kill them there.  He explained that this 
was important in his case, because it showed that the enforced dis-
appearance of Marco Antonio Molina Theissen was not an isolated 
example.313  This, coupled with the CEH’s finding that there were 
around 45,000 disappearances during the armed conflict, helped to 
establish the chain of command.314  Since his case was against offi-
cials who held high-level positions in the military during the armed 
conflict, including Benedicto Lucas García, the former chief of staff 
of the military, this evidence was critical.  
 
4.4.3.  Truth Commissions as Modus Operandi Experts 
 
Importantly, the TRC reports also offered Guatemalan courts in-
sights on the modus operandi employed by the military and police 
during the armed conflict.  In some instances, the courts were able 
to make links between the specific facts of the case in question and 
the general modus operandi of the Guatemalan government docu-
mented in the TRC reports.  For example, in Edgar Fernando Garcia I, 
the court concluded that the enforced disappearances of the leaders 
of the student labor organization AEU, including Fernando Garcia, 
were part of a general practice of enforced disappearances and 
                                               
 311 Edgar Fernando Garcia II, supra note 291, at 151. 
 312 Id. 
 313 Interview with Alejandro Rodriguez, supra note 61 (“Nosotros usamos el 
informe de la CEH en el caso Molina Theissen de diferentes maneras.  Primero a 
través de sus conclusiones para demostrar la política, los patrones sistemáticas del 
ejército, por ejemplo que había un circuito clandestino de atención, que metían a las 
personas en zonas militares, que mataban personas dentro de las bases militares.  
Todo ello es importante como contexto y no solo para demostrar que era un caso 
aislado sino que se trataba de una cadena de mando.”). 
 314 Id.  (“Además de que la CEH documentó más o menos 6,000 
desapariciones forzadas, y hay 45,000 casos de desapariciones forzadas.  También 
ahí se muestra la cadena de mando.”). 
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extrajudicial killing by the Guatemalan government during the 
armed conflict, which the CEH and REHMI reports extensively doc-
umented.315 
In Dos Erres, the court admitted the section of the CEH report 
entitled “Human rights violations and acts of violence,” because it 
established that the strategy applied by the army in Dos Erres was 
the same as that described in the military’s Victoria 82 Plan.  This 
Plan directed military units to “conduct security, development, 
counter-subversive operations, and ideological warfare in their re-
spective areas on a certain day at a certain time until the new orders 
were received, with the goal of locating, capturing, or destroying 
subversive elements or groups.”316  Citing the CEH report, the court 
explained that the military used violence and propagated terror in 
service of these operations to ensure that these communities would 
not support the insurgency.317  Whenever the army detected the 
presence of the guerilla in an area, it would go to that location or a 
nearby community and commit acts of violence against the local 
population.318 
In Ríos Montt, the court admitted the REMHI report because it 
described the various attacks by the military against the Ixil people, 
a civilian non-combatant population, and the militarization of daily 
life of the people in the Ixil region.319  In Rio Negro II, the court nar-
rated how, according to the CEH report, the military and paramili-
tary forces tied up the women of the community and treated them 
like animals in order to make the brutal repression of the Mayan 
population easier.320  In Edgar Leonel Paredes Chegüén, the court noted 
that the CEH report proved the modus operandi of military intelli-
gence operations during the armed conflict.321  
 
                                               
 315 Edgar Fernando Garcia I, supra note 289, at 62.  
 316 Dos Erres, supra note 287, at 235 (“Los comandos involucrados conducirán 
operaciones de seguridad, desarrollo, contrasubversivos y de guerra ideológica en 
sus respectivas áreas de responsabilidad a partir del día ‘D’ hora ‘H’ hasta nueva 
orden, con el objeto de localizar, capturar o destruir grupos o elementos 
subversivos, para garantizar la paz y seguridad de la Nación . . . .”). 
 317 Id. at 236. 
 318 Id. at 235. 
 319 Ríos Montt, supra note 255, at 664. 
 320 Río Negro II, supra note 281, at 336. 
 321 Edgar Leonel Paredes Chegüén, supra note 309, at 46. 
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4.4.4.  Truth Commissions as Corroborators  
 
Often times, the reports were admitted because they corrobo-
rated other evidence.  For instance, in Edgar Fernando Garcia II, the 
court admitted Volume III, because it confirmed the reports of four 
expert witnesses.322  In Myrna Mack Chang II, the court admitted the 
third volume of REMHI because it corroborated “essential aspects” 
of information contained in the CEH report.323  In the Spanish Em-
bassy case, the court admitted Case Study 79 from the CEH report, 
because of its congruence with other admitted evidence regarding 
the bombing of the embassy and the subsequent assassination of the 
Rector of the University of San Carlos and several students.324 
In Jute, the court noted that the explanation of the operations of 
the military commissioners in the CEH report, described in a previ-
ous section, corroborated other testimony presented at trial.325  Spe-
cifically, the court noted that the CEH corroborated the declaration 
of an expert witness who outlined the structure, chain of command, 
and operations of military commissioners, particularly during the 
period when the acts in question occurred.326  It also corroborated 
the testimony of two witnesses who described how the military pa-
trols in the town of Jute operated as well as the process that the ac-
cused, who witnesses identified as military commissioners, used to 
locate, conduct surveillance of, and capture victims.327  The court 
noted that the modus operandi described by these two witnesses 
                                               
 322 Edgar Fernando Garcia II, supra note 291, at 151 (“Es de utilidad para 
confirmer los peritajes rendidos por los peritos Katharine Temple Lapsley Doyle, 
Rember Aroldo Larios Tobar, Valia Elisa Muralles Bautista, Marina Consuelo 
García Bravatti de Villagran.”). 
 323 Myrna Mack Chang II, supra note 270, at 24 (El Informe Proyecto 
Interdiocesano de Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica “Guatemala, Nunca 
Más”.  Tomo III, “El Entorno Histórico”, en las páginas y número de texto asentadas 
en el acta correspondiente, nos sirven para establecer los siguientes aspectos: A) 
Este informe corrobora en aspectos esenciales, el contenido del Informe formulado 
por la comisión de Esclarecimiento Histórico, al hacer referencia a las violaciones 
de Derechos Humanos registrados durante el conflicto armado.”). 
 324 Interestingly, the investigation and determination of responsibility for the 
bombing of the Spanish Embassy was included as part of the mandate of the CEH.  
Spanish Embassy, C-01071-1980-00547, Tribunal Primero de Sentencia Penal, 
Narcoactividad, y Delitos contra el Ambiente de Guatemala, Sentence, January 19, 
2015, 286–88, 312. 
 325 Jute, supra note 301, at 128. 
 326 Id.  
 327 Id. at 128–29. 
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was the same as that described in the CEH report.328 
The court in Dos Erres also admitted the case study on the Dos 
Erres massacre from the CEH report because it corroborated the ex-
pert report rendered by Social Historian Manolo Estuardo Vela 
Castañeda.329  Both reports found that the army mistakenly believed 
that the Dos Erres community was linked to the guerilla group 
called Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (FAR) and that the massacre was in 
retribution for an ambush carried out by the FAR.330  The reports by 
CEH and the expert witness also both found that the kaibiles, a mil-
itary unit that specialized in these types of operations, were respon-
sible for the massacre, and that the high command of the military 
planned it.331  Chillingly, both reports also found that the Dos Erres 
massacre was the only one in the history of the Peten, a northern 
region of Guatemala, where a community was wiped entirely off the 
map.332 
Additionally, in Ríos Montt, the court admitted Volumes I, II, II, 
X, and XI of the CEH report, in part because it established that the 
strategy utilized by the military during the armed conflict in the 
1980s was the same as that delineated in the military’s plan called 
Victoria 82, which was also admitted into evidence.333  It also admit-
ted Volumes I, II, II, and IV of the REMHI report because it corrob-
orated the following evidence:  1) the testimony and report rendered 
by expert witness Nieves Gómez Dupuis; 2) the testimony of the sur-
vivors who described the massacres in the Ixil region and how the 
military’s goal was to destroy the seed of their population; 3) the 
testimony of both expert and lay witnesses who established that the 
armed conflict caused the destruction of their social fabric; 4) the tes-
timony of survivors about enforcement disappearances, torture, and 
their escape to the mountains; 5) the testimony of Ixil women about 
being raped by soldiers; and 6) the existence of the mechanisms of 
terror described in various military plans, including Victoria 82, 
Firmeza 83, and Operation Sofia.334 
 
                                               
 328 Id. at 129. 
 329 Dos Erres, supra note 287, at 238. 
 330 Id. at 238–39. 
 331 Id. at 239. 
 332 Id.  
 333 Ríos Montt, supra note 255, at 662–63. 
 334 Id. at 664. 
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4.4.5.  Truth Commissions on Collective Harm  
 
Truth commissions sometimes adopted the all-important role of 
conveying cultural information that helped courts understand why 
human rights abusers employ certain strategies and what harm they 
cause to both communities and individuals.  For instance, in Rio Ne-
gro II, drawing from the CEH report, the court explained that in ad-
dition to the physical harm caused by the repeated brutal rapes of 
the women and girls from Rio Negro, they also inflicted a symbolic 
injury on the community, because Mayan women bear the respon-
sibility for social and cultural reproduction in those communities.335  
Specifically, “the women personify the values that should be repro-
duced in the community and they were dishonored.”336  This expla-
nation helped the court understand that these acts were not isolated 
crimes, but rather part of an orchestrated military strategy.  In the 
same case, citing Case Study 14 from the CEH report, the court con-
cluded that the children of Rio Negro, who were taken and forced 
to be indentured servants for the very people that killed their rela-
tives, experienced immeasurable psycho-social consequences as a 
result of their degrading treatment and complete upheaval from 
their societal norms and culture.337 
Similarly, in Choatalum, a case in which a military commissioner 
was convicted of enforced disappearance during the armed conflict, 
the court admitted the CEH report because it explained the numer-
ous reasons, such as needing to flee to the mountains and the general 
climate of terror, that prevented thousands of Guatemalans from ob-
serving the rituals that they normally would perform when they lost 
a loved one.338  This caused profound pain in the affected communi-
ties, which was particularly acute in the instance of enforced disap-
pearance, because of the uncertainty of not knowing the wherea-
bouts or fate of the disappeared person.339  This was especially 
harmful to Mayan communities, who maintain a strong connection 
                                               
 335 Rio Negro II, supra note 281, at 336. 
 336 Id. (“Las mujeres personifican los valores que deben ser reproducidos en 
la comunidad y fueron mancilladas . . . .”). 
 337 Id. at 354. 
 338 Choatalum, C-26-2,006 Of. III, Tribunal de Sentencia Penal, Narcoactividad 
y Delitos contra el Ambiente del Departamento de Chimaltenango, Sentence, Sept. 
7, 2009, 69–70 [hereinafter Choatalum]. 
 339 Id. 
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with the dead.340  The trial court also, significantly, noted that the 
CEH found that the clandestine cemeteries and the anxiety of not 
knowing what happened to their relatives, even today, continues to 
be an open wound in the country and a permanent reminder of the 
violent acts that degraded the dignity of their loved ones.341  This 
finding became particularly important later in this case, when on 
appeal, the Guatemalan Constitutional Court found that enforced 
disappearance does not have a statute of limitations because of the 
continuing nature of harm it causes.342  
Similarly, the court in Edgar Fernando Garcia II admitted Volume 
I of REMHI entitled “The Impact of Violence” because it discussed 
the context that produced enforced disappearances and explained 
the unresolved grief that they caused for the family and friends of 
the disappeared.343 
 
4.4.6.  Truth Commissions as Investigatory Bodies 
 
Truth commissions also acted as investigatory bodies, which 
was critical given that many of Guatemala’s state institutions were 
either corrupt or completely ineffectual.344  For example, as the CEH 
noted in its report, the Guatemalan judiciary was unable to guaran-
tee compliance with the law and tolerated and, in some instances, 
fomented violence.345  In fact, during the armed conflict, the Guate-
malan government used the judiciary as a tool to shield its repres-
sive actions from judgment and repress its enemies.346  Additionally, 
many of the institutions that would have been responsible for 
                                               
 340 Id. 
 341 Id. at 70. 
 342 Choatalum, Corte de Constitucionalidad. 
 343 Edgar Fernando Garcia II, supra note 291, at 151. 
 344 CEH Report, supra note 80, at 23 (“El Sistema judicial del país, por su 
ineficacia provocada o deliberada, no garantizó el cumplimiento de la ley, 
tolerando y hasta propiciando la violencia.  Por omisión o acción, el Poder Judicial 
contribuyó al agravamiento de los conflictos sociales en distintos momentos de la 
historia de Guatemala.  La impunidad caló hasta el punto de apoderarse de la 
estructura misma del Estado, y se convirtió tanto en un medio como en un fin.  
Como medio, cobijó y protegió las actuaciones represivas del Estado, así como las 
de particulares afines a sus propósitos, mientras que, como fin, fue consecuencia de 
los métodos aplicados para reprimir y eliminar a los adversarios políticos y 
sociales.”) 
 345 Id. 
 346 Id. 
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investigating and collecting evidence did not exist at the time of the 
crimes.  For example, Ley Orgánica del Ministerio Público, which cre-
ated the Attorney General’s office, only went into effect in 1994.347  
Similarly, the Congress enacted the first Code of Criminal Procedure 
in 1992.348 
For that reason, TRCs sometimes had to guard evidence that 
likely would have been destroyed if a state institution had gotten 
ahold of it.  For example, in Edgar Fernando García I, the court admit-
ted recorded testimony that REMHI had obtained from an anony-
mous source.  The case involved the disappearance of Edgar Fer-
nando García, who the National Police had detained along with 
another student, Danilo Chinchilla.349  García and Chinchilla were 
two of seven student leaders of a labor organization at the Univer-
sity of San Carlos who the police had detained during a three-month 
period.350  During the arrest, the police shot Chinchilla as he tried to 
escape and he was taken to Hospital Roosevelt.351  Once there, a 
group of leaders from the Guatemalan Labor Party helped him es-
cape.352  At that time, Chinchilla made a tape recording in which he 
explained what happened to García and him when they were de-
tained.353  Many years later, when REMHI began its investigation, 
the recording was given to the director of ODHAG so that it could 
be analyzed as part of REMHI.354  Chinchilla later became one of the 
numerous disappeared in Guatemala and thus was unable to testify 
at trial, so the prosecutor sought to admit his recorded testimony.355  
After hearing testimony from Chinchilla’s partner who verified 
without hesitation that the voice on the recording was Chinchilla’s, 
                                               
 347 Ley Orgánica del Ministerio Público, Decreto Numero 40–94, 
http://www.oas.org/JURIDICO/mla/sp/gtm/sp_gtm-mla-leg-publico.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BB5F-G96M].  Public Hearing by Judge Miguel Angel Galvez in 
Ríos Montt (Feb. 4, 2013). 
 348 Decreto Numero 51-92. 
 349 CEH Report, supra note 80, at 145 (Tomo VI, Anexo I, Casos Ilustrativos, 
CI 48, Desapariciones forzadas de Edgar Fernando García, Sergio Saúl Linares 
Morales y Rubén Amílcar Farfán.  Fundación del Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo (GAM)). 
 350 Id. 
 351 Edgar Fernando Garcia I, supra note 289, at 63.  CEH Report, supra note 80, 
at 146 (Tomo VI, Anexo I, Casos Ilustrativos, CI 48, Desapariciones forzadas de 
Edgar Fernando García, Sergio Saúl Linares Morales y Rubén Amílcar Farfán. 
Fundación del Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo (GAM)).  
 352 Id. 
 353 Edgar Fernando Garcia I, supra note 289, at 63. 
 354 Id. 
 355 Id. at 64–65. 
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the court admitted it into evidence.356  The court said that the record-
ing made them certain about the detention and subsequent disap-
pearance of Fernando García.357  
The court in Edgar Fernando García I also admitted a certificate 
that contained testimony collected by REMHI regarding efforts 
made to locate Edgar Fernando García after his disappearance, in-
cluding filing legal complaints and publishing announcements in 
Guatemalan newspapers.358  Similarly, in Edgar Fernando García II, 
the court admitted a questionnaire from an interview conducted by 
REMHI because it contained information about Edgar Fernando 
García as well as documents related to his disappearance.359  
Later down the line, TRC reports also provided a blueprint for 
prosecutors’ investigations of cases.  Numerous prosecutors and at-
torneys from human rights organizations explained that in nearly 
all of their cases, they used both the REMHI and CEH reports as a 
launching point for their investigations.360  Hilda Pineda said that 
“one of the first things prosecutors in her office do when they start 
an investigation is check if the case is documented in the REMHI or 
CEH reports.”361  She said that “it opens the door for us to enter.”362  
Sometimes, prosecutors used the report to identify witnesses and 
even perpetrators.363  Given that witnesses were not named in either 
report and perpetrators were not named in the CEH report, this is a 
surprising revelation.  In the case of REMHI, the directors of the pro-
ject explained that sometimes they would act as liaisons between 
witnesses and prosecutors from the Attorney General’s Office.364  
For example, if the Attorney General’s office hoped to bring a case 
regarding a particular event, they would consult REMHI’s database 
                                               
 356 Id. at 65. 
 357  Id. 
 358 Id. at 74. 
 359 Edgar Fernando Garcia II, supra note 291, at 149–50. 
 360 Interviews with attorneys from GAM, ODHAG, CALDH, and MTM, and 
prosecutors Hilda Pineda and Orlando Lopez.  
 361 Interview with Hilda Pineda, supra note 198 (“Primero porque nos dan las 
primeras herramientas para iniciar nuestra investigación.  Una de las acciones 
preliminares que realiza el fiscal es verificar si en el  REMHI o en la Comisión de 
Esclarecimiento Histórico está el caso documentado.  Porque esto nos ayuda a 
buscar información que ahí mismo se relaciona.”).  
 362 Id. (“Nos abre la puerta para entrar.”) 
 363 Id. 
 364 Interview with Edgar Gutiérrez, supra note 152; Interview with a Diocese 
Coordinator of REMHI, supra note 153. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
  
812 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 39:3 
to identify potential witnesses.365  ODHAG would then contact the 
witness to see if they would consent to having their contact infor-
mation shared with the Attorney General’s Office and possibly tes-
tify before a tribunal.366  This happened in the case of Fernando García 
I.  According to Alejandro Rodriguez, who worked in the office of 
the Procurador de los Derechos Humanos when it brought the case, his 
legal team consulted the REMHI database and identified a person 
who ended up being a key witness in their case.367  
Both the REMHI and CEH reports also helped investigators lo-
cate clandestine graves.  Hilda Pineda explained that the reports 
helped investigators locate where potential witnesses might be or 
specific information about the location of the graves.  With this in-
formation, her investigators are able to go to that location and ask 
people where the remains might be.  In some cases, the family bur-
ied the victims themselves and could tell them exactly where they 
were buried.368  Alejandro Rodriquez also described how the reports 
provided a legal basis for people to petition for exhumations be-
cause they described the approximate location where their family 
member might be buried.369   In the Choatalum case, the trial court 
explained that it considered REMHI and CEH “relevant and perti-
nent in the clarification of the case, especially because they helped 
identify the whereabouts of a clandestine grave in a location where 
a military base operated at the time of the armed conflict.”370 The 
reports also provided a basis for victims to ask for reparations from 
the Guatemalan government.371 
The reports were also informative for judges.  Pulling a copy of 
                                               
 365 Id. 
 366 Id.  
 367 Interview with Alejandro Rodriguez, supra note 61. 
 368 Interview with Hilda Pineda, supra note 198 (“Algunas informaciones nos 
han ayudado, por lo menos, a ubicar testigos dentro del caso o alguna relación en 
específico del lugar, porque ya con el lugar nosotros ya nos desplazamos y esto hace 
que las personas luego nos digan y nos señalen el lugar donde posiblemente esté 
una persona enterrada de manera clandestina, o por necesidad de la familia en los 
operativos militares algunos familiares los enterraron ellos mismos.”). 
 369 Interview with Alejandro Rodriguez, supra note 61 (“Para la gente también 
es importante, porque también permite solicitar exhumaciones porque se señalan 
los lugares o lugares aproximados a donde pertenecía la víctima.”). 
 370 Choatalum, supra note 338, at 70 (“[C]onclusiones de estos informes que 
este tribunal considera relevantes y pertinentes para el esclarecimiento del presente 
caso, toda vez que en el caso concreto se probó la existencia de un cementerio clan-
destino en el lugar donde funcionó un destacamento militar.”). 
 371 Interview with Alejandro Rodriguez, supra note 61. 
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REMHI from his shelf, Judge Miguel Angel Galvez told me that 
REMHI was very valuable to him because it helped him to identify 
what military reports and other documents to consult.372  This is par-
ticularly significant as Judge Galvez declassified a number of mili-
tary documents in the Diario Militar case.373  They also are helpful 
tools for human rights organizations when training new staff.  The 
legal director of Grupo Apoyo Mutual (GAM) explained that 
REMHI and CEH are mandatory reading for all new hires.374 
 
4.4.7.  Truth Commissions as Reporters to the Experts   
 
The TRC Reports also provided helpful background information 
for expert witnesses.  In Plan de Sanchez, an expert witness on mili-
tary strategy recounted how the CEH explained the concept of “in-
ternal enemy” found in the military’s manual on the war against 
subversives.375  Drawing from what he had read in the CEH report, 
he interpreted the reference to the internal enemy to mean, practi-
cally speaking, that the military must eliminate communists, collab-
orators, and anyone that, even without being a communist, supports 
the ideology and favors using subversive activities to take power.376  
When discussing the G2, a Guatemalan military unit, he quoted the 
CEH report as the basis for his finding that military intelligence was 
based on gossip, which explains why there was so much abuse of 
innocent people.377 
In Sepur Zarco, Prudencio Garcia Martinez de Murguia, an expert 
witness on military operations, used both REMHI and CEH as the 
basis of his opinion.  He specifically referenced REMHI, stating that 
the military’s objective was to paralyze the indigenous population 
who might give support to the guerilla by indicating, explicitly or 
implicitly, that if you collaborate with the guerilla, what happened 
                                               
 372 Interview with Miguel Angel Galvez (Nov. 14, 2016). 
 373 Evelyn De León, Juez Gálvez desclasifica 8 planes militares del conflicto armado, 
SOY 502 (Mar. 31, 2016), https://www.soy502.com/articulo/juez-galvez-
desclasifica-8-planes-militares-conflicto-armado [https://perma.cc/P6JX-WCQP]. 
 374 Interview with Mynor Alvarado, supra note 154 (“Es como una lectura 
obligatoria para quienes se integran, para que se enteren de la situación.”) 
 375 Plan de Sanchez, C-01076-2011-00001 Of. 1, Tribunal Primero de Sentencia 
Penal, Narcoactividad y Delitos Contra el Ambiente (Mayor Riesgo A), Sentence, 
March 14, 2012, 45. [hereinafter Plan de Sanchez] 
 376 Id. at 45, 77. 
 377 Id. at 60. 
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to your brother, father, or neighbor will happen to you.378  He also 
referred to the great number of cases of rape documented by the 
CEH report as evidence that it was a regular practice of the Guate-
malan army during the armed conflict.379  He also noted that the 
CEH described how the military would always separate the women 
from everyone else when they descended on a village.380  The expert 
witness concluded that this demonstrated premeditation and noted 
that the report made it clear that these incidents were not isolated 
outbursts of hate or savagery aimed at those in close proximity.381  
The court gave evidentiary weight to both of these findings.382  The 
expert also noted that REMHI demonstrated a clear harm to the psy-
chology of the Maya population that resulted from these assaults.383 
Similarly, in Plan de Sanchez, an expert witness on social psychol-
ogy drew from the CEH report when finding that rape was a com-
mon practice during the armed conflict and designed to destroy the 
dignity of a person in the most intimate way.384  Noting the report, 
the expert also described the collective harm to the Mayan commu-
nities that experienced communal shame from the memory of the 
rape of Mayan women in their communities.385 
In Edgar Fernando Garcia I, an expert witness named Fernando 
Arturo Lopez Antillon, who was a former director of ODHAG and 
provided his expertise on the use of recurso de exhibicion personal 
(which is similar to our habeas corpus) during the period when Ed-
gar disappeared, explained that he used both REMHI and CEH as 
background information for his testimony.386 
 
5.  LESSONS FROM GUATEMALA ABOUT POST-CONFLICT PLURALISM  
 
The example of Guatemalan transitional justice offers broader 
lessons for how post-conflict pluralism can have liberalizing effects 
and fortify the rule of law.  Specifically, at the macro level, the TRCs 
                                               
 378  Sepur Zarco, supra note 286, at 57. 
 379 Id. at 60. 
 380 Id. at 63. 
 381 Id.  
 382 Id. at 69. 
 383 Id. at 60. 
 384 Plan de Sanchez, supra note 375, at 87–88. 
 385 Id. at 88. 
 386 Edgar Fernando Garcia I, supra note 289, at 38. 
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in Guatemala:  1) diffused legal norms derived from international 
human rights and humanitarian law locally; 2) created space for the 
expression of alternative narratives about the armed conflict that 
countered the dominant official narrative and ultimately influenced 
judicial decision-making; and 3) filled a void when impartial and 
independent state institutions did not exist. 
 
5.1.  TRCs Diffuse Human Rights Norms 
 
First, the case of Guatemala demonstrates how TRCs can act as 
“norm diffusers,” spreading the legal norms and precedent of inter-
national human rights law to local jurisdictions.387  Even though, as 
specified in its mandate, the CEH was not supposed to have any le-
gal effect, it succeeded in bringing the language and norms of inter-
national human rights to Guatemala very visibly and with a veil of 
authority.  As I explained in Part II, the CEH interpreted the Oslo 
Agreement’s reference to human rights as an instruction to use in-
ternational human rights and humanitarian law when evaluating 
what occurred during the armed conflict.388  It, thus, characterized 
the crimes it documented using the language of international crimi-
nal justice and human rights law instead of ordinary crimes.  For 
instance, using the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide, which Guatemala ratified in 1950, as its 
legal basis, the CEH concluded that the military perpetrated acts of 
genocide against the Mayan-Ixil population from 1980 to 1983.389  
The CEH found that, in that region, between 70% to 90% of the 
towns were razed to the ground.390 
                                               
 387 Berman, supra note 15, at 1173 (defining norm entrepreneurs as “individ-
uals or groups who try to influence popular opinion in order to inculcate a social 
norm.”) 
 388 CEH Report, supra note 80, at 45. 
 389 Id. at 358 (“A juicio de la CEH, el conjunto de acciones violentas 
perpetradas por el Estado contra la población maya-ixil durante los años 1980–1983, 
permite concluir que se cometieron actos de genocidio, inspirados por una 
determinación estratégica que también revistió carácter genocida, por cuanto un 
objetivo de la campaña militar contrainsurgente fue la destrucción parcial del grupo 
víctima, al considerarse que de esta manera se lograría vencer al enemigo.”). Gua-
temala ratified the Genocide Convention in 1950, before the armed conflict began. 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].  
 390 See CEH Report, supra note 80, at 358 (“El caso más notable es el de la 
región Ixil, donde entre el 70% y el 90% de las aldeas fueron arrasadas.”). 
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A comparison between the cases before and after the release of 
the TRC reports reveal their persuasive effect, particularly with re-
gard to how courts classified crimes associated with the armed con-
flict.  Prior to their release, Guatemalan courts exclusively character-
ized even the gravest international crimes as common crimes such 
as homicide, assassination, or kidnapping.  As one human rights at-
torney explained, the Guatemalan judicial system was not accus-
tomed to using terms like crimes against humanity, disappearance, 
or torture.391  As a result of a deliberate campaign by the military to 
discredit human rights defenders, human rights was associated with 
communism; it was synonymous with something bad.392  So even 
though Guatemala incorporated crimes such as genocide and war 
crimes into its criminal code in 1973, Guatemalan courts did not clas-
sify the grave crimes committed during the armed conflict as such 
until the late 90s.393  This change is particularly telling for convic-
tions rendered after the enactment of Guatemala’s amnesty law in 
1996, which extinguished criminal liability for any common or po-
litical crimes related to the armed conflict, but not for core interna-
tional crimes, like genocide, torture, and enforced disappearance.394  
For example, in the decision Rio Negro I, rendered in 1998, the Gua-
temalan court classified the crimes associated with the Rio Negro 
massacre as assassination, instead of as genocide or crimes against 
humanity.  However, after the release of the CEH report, prosecu-
tors start charging crimes as genocide, crimes against humanity, and 
enforced disappearances.  
Most strikingly, the CEH’s conclusion that the military perpe-
trated acts of genocide against the Mayan-Ixil population was the 
impetus for two cases that included charges of genocide.395  Not only 
was this finding the basis of the Guatemalan Generals case in Spain, 
in which genocide was charged, but also in the Ríos Montt case in 
                                               
 391 Interview with Mynor Alvarado, supra note 154 (“La explicación es que, 
nuestro sistema judicial no estaba acostumbrado a estos casos de lesa humanidad, 
desaparición, tortura. Eran términos que no se utilizaban.”). 
 392 Id. (“Los derechos humanos en Guatemala estaban asimilados a la guerri-
lla.  Es decir, el término viene de los comunistas, desde los guerrilleros.”). 
 393 See Mark Berlin & Geoff Dancy, The Difference Law Makes: Domestic Atrocity 
Laws and Human Rights Prosecutions, 51 L. & SOC’Y. REV. 533 (2017) (noting that Gua-
temalan courts rejected challenges to the prosecution of government officials in the 
1990s because the country’s amnesty law specifically excluded crimes against hu-
manity and genocide from amnesty).  
 394 Guatemalan National Reconciliation Law, Decree 145-96, Dec. 27, 1996. 
 395 Id. at 358. Guatemala ratified the Genocide Convention in 1950, before the 
armed conflict began. Genocide Convention, supra note 389. 
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Guatemala, which was the first time that a former head of state was 
tried for genocide in their home country.  Prior to the release of the 
CEH report, what occurred in Guatemala had not been officially 
characterized as genocide.396 
Given the gap between the enactment of atrocity laws in the 
early 70s and their use in criminal cases involving grave crimes com-
mitted during the armed conflict, the TRCs, by using human rights 
language to characterize the crimes committed during the armed 
conflict, facilitated the internalization of human norms, particularly 
amongst state actors.  The TRCs bolstered human rights advocates’ 
claims that these crimes rose to the level of grave international 
crimes and created political openings for the prosecution of high 
level military officials.  In the view of one human rights advocate I 
interviewed, the most important aspect of the CEH report was its 
classification of the facts as crimes, because it provided judges with 
cover in their decisions.397 
Many scholars have examined how legal norms diffuse across 
judicial networks.398  However, less attention has been paid to how 
TRCs that characterize abuses using the human rights frame can also 
spread human rights norms.  This finding also builds on the work 
of other scholars in the political science arena, which examine what 
factors encourage compliance with human rights law in domestic 
contexts, particularly those scholars who have explored why prose-
cutions of human rights violations occur in some post-conflict soci-
eties but not others.  For instance, Beth Simmons has theorized that 
ratification of human rights treaties promotes local diffusion of hu-
man rights norms in transitioning countries by creating a favorable 
environment for civil society to demand rights, thereby facilitating 
social mobilization.399  She theorizes that treaties catalyze a reorien-
tation of citizens’ values and beliefs by reframing their grievances 
                                               
 396 CEH Report, supra note 80, at 358 (“El caso más notable es el de la región 
Ixil, donde entre el 70% y el 90% de las aldeas fueron arrasadas.”). 
 397 Interview of a Member of the Legal Team at ODHAG Who Wishes to 
Remain Anonymous (July 27, 2016) (“Esto ha permitido que los jueces se sientan 
más amparados en cuanto a sus conclusiones.  Lo vimos en el único caso de juicio 
por genocidio en contra de Efraín Ríos Montt.”). 
 398 See generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 148 (2004) 
(describing principles underlying the formation of the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Court); Harold 
Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2638 
(1997); Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational 
Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 Geo. L.J. 487 (2005). 
 399 See SIMMONS, supra note 8, at 148. 
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with the state in terms of guaranteed rights.400 
In a more recent study, Mark Berlin and Geoff Dancy concluded 
that the codification of human rights treaties into domestic criminal 
codes increases the likelihood that human rights prosecutions will 
occur.401  Yet, these studies do not account for the justice delay be-
tween the adoption of human rights treaties and their use in prose-
cutions experienced in a number of countries, including Guatemala.  
The findings of this study point to the need for an external catalyz-
ing factor, such as the intervention of a credible TRC that recasts past 
violations using the human rights framework, in order to effectuate 
the internalization of human rights norms.  This study thus invites 
further empirical research into whether this finding—i.e. that TRCs 
encourage internalization of human rights norms, as manifested by 
its use in litigation—is generalizable or specific to the context of 
Guatemala. 
The study also adds to the literature on socialization of states by 
suggesting that acculturation not only occurs among states, but also 
between transitional justice mechanisms and states.  This may also 
explain Simmons’s finding that ratification of human rights treaties 
only had a measurable effect on human rights compliance in transi-
tioning countries, but not stable democratic countries or authoritar-
ian regimes.402  
 
5.2.  TRCs Create Space for Narrative Contestation 
 
In addition to diffusing legal norms, TRCs can offer a locale for 
narrative contestation, which can also greatly affect judicial deci-
sion-making.  As prominent legal scholar Robert Cover explained in 
his landmark work, Nomos and Narrative, “[n]o set of legal institu-
tions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it 
and give it meaning.”403  In countries transitioning after mass atroc-
ities have occurred, the national narrative, or what sociologist Émile 
Durkheim called the collective conscience, which is a nation’s or so-
ciety’s collective understanding of its own history, must be recon-
structed.404  Since individuals likely experience mass atrocity 
                                               
 400 Id. at 152. 
 401 See generally Berlin & Dancy, supra note 393. 
402 SIMMONS, supra note 8, at 82–86. 
403 Cover, supra note 30, at 4. 
404 EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 79 (George Simpson trans., 
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differently depending on their socioeconomic and cultural identity, 
creating a common understanding of the past to forge a national 
identity is extremely challenging. 
This was certainly the case in Guatemala, where citizens had 
very different experiences of the violence depending on whether 
they were urban or rural, poor or wealthy, and Mayan or ladino.  For 
example, if you were a wealthy ladino living in Guatemala City, you 
might have been only vaguely aware of the scorched earth campaign 
in the countryside.405  This divide made the work of the TRCs all the 
more important.  Because the TRCs interviewed thousands of indi-
viduals all across Guatemala in an attempt to clarify the past, a task 
that courts are not equipped to take on, they were able to construct 
a collective narrative that was a composite of all of those individual 
voices.  The narrative that emerged from this process was quite dif-
ferent from the official state narrative that the military had propa-
gated during the years of the conflict.  In Christian Tomuschat’s own 
words, before the CEH released its report, “the country felt that the 
armed conflict was a big success; that the country had been saved 
from Communism and that it had in fact been a terrible tragedy did 
not enter their minds.”406  Hilda Pineda, the current head of the war 
crimes unit in the Guatemalan Attorney General’s office, explained 
that part of the strategy of the Guatemalan government was to en-
sure that no one knew what was happening.  That allowed them to 
guard their prestige.407  She said that she has even called journalists 
to testify in her cases about how they were censured and prevented 
from informing the public about what occurred.408  Once the CEH’s 
finding that the military was responsible for over 90% of the crimes 
                                               
1933) (describing the collective conscience as the “totality of beliefs and sentiments 
common to average citizens of the same society”). 
 405 Interview with Hilda Pineda, supra note 198 (“El ejército, parte de su 
política de arrasamiento de tierras y de estrategia militar fue no permitir ninguna 
publicidad, no se sabía lo que ocurría, las comunidades estaban sufriendo de una 
manera tan cruel y despiadada y sin embargo muchas personas de la ciudad nunca 
se enteraron de lo que ocurría.”) 
 406 Interview with Christian Tomuschat, supra note 109. 
 407 Interview with Hilda Pineda, supra note 198. 
 408 Id. (“Por mucho tiempo se ocultaron los hechos, incluso los mismo de 
comunicación que han declarados en algunos de los juicios, el caso de Ríos Montt, 
el caso de la embajada de España, el caso de Fernando García, han llegado 
periodistas a ser testigos de los juicios y ellos mismo dicen ‘teníamos censura, 
estábamos censurados, no podíamos decir lo que ocurría, no podíamos informar.’”
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went public, it took away from the military’s prestige and glory.409  
According to Christian Tomuschat, discrediting the military, which 
still had a tremendous amount of political power in Guatemala, was 
one of the most important outcomes of the CEH’s work.410  
The narrative shifting work of the TRCs had a very tangible im-
pact in Guatemala.  This recasting of the narrative of the armed con-
flict and resultant delegitimization of the military created an open-
ing for prosecutions of high-level officials that did not exist prior to 
the release of the CEH.411  As the former Attorney General of Guate-
mala Claudia Paz y Paz explained, the CEH report was critical not 
only because it defined the crimes of the military, but also because 
it created the political will necessary to bring the cases charging 
those crimes.412  Similarly, Alejandro Rodriguez believes that the 
most important thing that REMHI and CEH did was to engender a 
movement for justice.413  In his own words, “Here, without a doubt, 
the CEH report shook Guatemala and opened the way to start the 
fight for justice.”414  
In addition, Alejandro Rodriguez believes that without the CEH 
report, civil society would not have been able to advocate as suc-
cessfully for the need to construct new legal systems.415  In his view, 
the CEH report motivated the population.  It generated a space to 
discuss what had never been discussed before.416  He explained that 
before the release of the CEH report, everyone was afraid.  It is hard 
to describe or understand the fear that existed in 1993 and 1994, 
much less the early 80s.  The population was completely 
                                               
 409 Interview with Christian Tomuschat, supra note 109. 
 410 Id. 
 411 García-Godos & Raúl Salvado, Guatemala: Truth and Memory on Trial, supra 
note 92, at 208 (“The first major impulse leading to judicial processes for past hu-
man rights abuses was the delivery of the CEH report in 1999.  The report offered 
a window of opportunity for victims’ groups and human rights organizations to 
put forward claims to establish responsibility for past crimes.”) 
 412 Interview with Claudia Paz y Paz, Former Attorney General of Guatemala 
(Feb. 14, 2017). 
 413 Interview with Alejandro Rodríguez, supra note 61 (“Creo que eso es lo 
más importante, el proceso REHMI y comisión genera un moviente en busca de la 
justicia.”). 
 414 Id. (“. . . aquí sin duda el impacto de la CEH sacudió a Guatemala y abrió 
el camino para iniciar la lucha por la justicia.”). 
 415 Id. (“Sin el informe de la CEH no se hubiese podido avanzar en la 
necesidad de construcción de nuevos sistemas jurídicos.”). 
 416 Id. (“Pero probablemente el informe de la CEH conmovió a la población.  
Primero generó el espacio para discutir algo que nunca se había discutido, que todo 
el mundo tenía miedo de poderlo hacer.”). 
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immobilized.417  The CEH was critical in creating safe spaces where 
victims could express themselves, discuss what really happened, 
and develop their own history.418  
The significance of historical narrative is all the more important 
when courts grapple with extraordinary crimes, like genocide and 
crimes against humanity.  As Neha Jain explains in Radical Dissents, 
“unlike the standard case of trials for ordinary crimes, extraordinary 
criminality such as mass atrocity requires the construction of a 
broader context that provides meaning and content to the conduct 
of the individual accused in the courtroom.”419  This is because, by 
their very definition, crimes against humanity and genocide require 
prosecutors to prove that individual attacks are part of a broader 
operation.420   
Due to the time and procedural constraints that courts face, 
courtrooms are not suitable venues for developing the historical 
context needed to understand these crimes.  For that reason, the nar-
ratives documented by the TRCs in Guatemala supplied more than 
just the historical backdrop of the crimes; they significantly influ-
enced how courts determined what crimes had been committed, 
why they occurred, and who was culpable for them.  As I described 
in Part III, prior to the release of the CEH, Guatemalan courts often 
portrayed the crimes associated with the armed conflict as the acts 
of rogue military or paramilitary officials, or as the court did in Rio 
Negro I, as the acts of civilians with no connection to the military.421  
The REMHI and CEH reports revealed that these were not the 
                                               
 417 Id. (“La verdad es que no logró como describir o aprehender el fenómeno 
del miedo que había en 1993–1994, la que población esta inmovilizada completa-
mente.  Y ya ni regresemos al 84, que son ya 30–35 años que llevan estos juicios . . . 
.”). 
 418 Id. (“El sistema de justicia ha cambiado muchísimo y el CEH fue central 
en generar espacios de confianza, discusión de la verdad, que las victimas pudieran 
tener un espacio para expresarse, y una reivindicación histórica.”). 
 419 Neha Jain, Radical Dissents in International Criminal Trials, 28 EUR. J. INT’L. 
L. 1163 (2017).  
 420 For example, the Rome Statute—the treaty that created the International 
Criminal Court (ICC)—provides that in order for a crime to be classified as a crime 
against humanity it must be part of a “widespread or systematic” attack.  Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7, 37 I.L.M. 1002 (1998), 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90.  An attack is considered “widespread” either because of the large num-
ber of victims in a single incident, or the cumulative effects of a number of incidents.  
Laurel E. Fletcher, From Indifference to Engagement: Bystanders and International Crim-
inal Justice, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1013 (2005).  To be “systematic,” it must have oc-
curred as part of an organized plan to commit violence against a collective.  Id. 
 421 Rio Negro I, Part B, supra note 260, at 1–2, 67. 
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random acts of a few bad apples, but rather part of a broader orches-
trated military plan, thus legitimizing the narrative of Mayan com-
munities whose voices have traditionally be marginalized in Guate-
mala.  In this way, the TRCs had a similar effect to what Beth 
Simmons theorizes regarding human rights treaties, namely they 
empowered groups with different rights preferences than the coun-
try’s political elites.422 
 
5.3.  TRCs Fulfill the Duties of Corrupt or Ineffective State Institutions 
 
Finally, because TRCs are typically state-sanctioned entities, but 
operate independently from the government, they can fill a void 
when state institutions are corrupt or inoperable. As was the case in 
Guatemala, after mass atrocities occur, state entities may be defunct 
or act in the service of human rights abusers.  Under these circum-
stances, affected communities are justified in being mistrustful, even 
suspicious, of the exercise of state power and the impartiality of gov-
ernment institutions, like the judiciary.   In this context, decentral-
ized sources of authority, particularly when it comes to addressing 
the violent acts of the past, may be advantageous.  As I have noted 
in prior work, “[b]ecause ‘[t]he repeated experience of domination 
and defeat leads to psychic withdrawal from the public sphere,’ an-
other related goal of transitional justice is the reintegration of vic-
tims into society.”423  Building institutions that act in an official ca-
pacity, but are not state actors per se, like truth commissions, can 
create arenas where victims or marginalized groups can engage 
with an authority figure in ways that rebuild their trust and confi-
dence in the rule of law.  Even entities like REMHI that were not 
state-sanctioned, but had the backing of the Catholic Church, an au-
thority figure in Guatemala, can serve important state-like functions 
in situations when state institutions are compromised.424 
Moreover, in countries like Guatemala, where the entire state ap-
paratus was involved in mass atrocity and state officials including 
police may have an incentive to destroy or tamper with evidence, 
                                               
 422 SIMMONS, supra note 8, at 125. 
 423 Rachel López, The (Re)collection of Memory After Mass Atrocity and the Di-
lemma for Transitional Justice, 47 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 799, 838 (2015) (quoting 
Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on Lawyering and Power, 
1988 WIS. L. REV. 699, 752). 
 424 Interview with Judge Miguel Galvez, supra note 372. 
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TRCs can play a special role as custodians of evidence.  In a number 
of cases, REMHI filled this role.  As mentioned above, REMHI cre-
ated the first forensic team in Guatemala and the Attorney General’s 
office used the forensic evidence gathered by this team in its cases.425  
Similarly, in Edgar Fernando García I, the court admitted the recorded 
testimony of another student who was detained at the same time as 
Fernando Garcia and explained what occurred.  This recording was 
given to REMHI for safekeeping during the armed conflict and since 
that student later went missing, the court would not have had access 
to this information if REMHI had not safeguarded it.426  In that case, 
the recording was determinative to the court’s final decision.427 
This finding builds on the work of other scholars who have dis-
cussed the integrated nature of fact-finding, particularly in the hu-
man rights field.  In particular, Pammela Quinn has discussed the 
importance of other outside entities, who gather facts, later used by 
courts in their decision-making.428  As Quinn points out, courts are 
often ill-equipped to engage in the intensive fact-finding needed to 
make fully informed judicial decisions.429  In contrast to courts, these 
non-judicial institutions, such as TRCs, special rapporteurs, and 
other ad hoc appointees are able to draw from a more extensive rec-
ord and examine a large number of human rights violations as op-
posed to a single case that is the subject of a prosecution or other 
legal dispute.430 
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
 
As I have outlined in this article, the relics of the peace versus 
justice debate have created unhelpful binary thinking about transi-
tional justice that persists today.  Even though scholars have begun 
to acknowledge that the debate does not accurately reflect the lived 
experience of post-conflict societies, the tendency to evaluate 
                                               
 425 Interview with a Diocese Coordinator of REMHI, supra note 153. 
 426 CEH Report, supra note 80, at 145 (Tomo VI, Anexo I, Casos Ilustrativos, 
CI 48, Desapariciones forzadas de Edgar Fernando García, Sergio Saúl Linares 
Morales y Rubén Amílcar Farfán.  Fundación del Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo (GAM)). 
 427 Edgar Fernando García I, supra note 289, at 65. 
 428 See generally Pammela Quinn Saunders, The Integrated Enforcement of Hu-
man Rights, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 97 (2012). 
 429 Pammela Quinn, supra note 14 (“As critical as facts and fact-finding are to 
judicial decision-making, courts are often poorly equipped to unearth them.”). 
 430 Id. 
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transitional justice mechanisms as separate unrelated entities per-
sists today and stymies further development of the field. 
This study, because it is grounded in information from primary 
sources obtained through field research in Guatemala and Spain, 
provides a much richer picture of how the work of transitional jus-
tice mechanisms can be complementary.  On one hand, the investi-
gation, or lack thereof, can inform how TRCs evaluate the judiciary 
in post-conflict countries and even aid in fact-finding.  On the other 
hand, as the case of Guatemala reveals, TRCs are not simply lesser 
versions of traditional justice proceedings, but rather can play a crit-
ical role in advancing traditional justice and the rule of law in post-
conflict societies, by acting as norm diffusers, investigative units, lo-
cales for narrative contestation, and cultural conveyers to courts.  
Post-conflict pluralism thus can be a vehicle for liberalization and 
democratization. 
In light of its benefits, we should embrace post-conflict plural-
ism, not only because it is inevitable, but also because it is desirable.  
I thus urge us to design future transitional justice systems with the 
coordination of these individual mechanisms in mind.  This opens 
the door for additional research in this area. For example, future re-
searchers might examine how to balance the utility of TRC reports 
as evidence in criminal trials with the due process rights of the ac-
cused. 
In countries like El Salvador, whose high court recently invali-
dated the amnesty law enacted after that country’s civil war, and 
Colombia, a country navigating its own transition, lessons about 
post-conflict pluralism learned from the Guatemalan experience 
will help them to anticipate ways that the work of TRCs (past or fu-
ture) and trials can be more fully integrated.   
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